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Aid is one of the biggest issues in the interdependent world of
today. It is considered as helping to solve the North-South problem
the world is presently facing. Apart from humanitarian purposes and
alleviation of poverty, the purpose of aid is to promote the overall
development of recipient countries in terms of general economy,
industry and social. welfare through provision of materials, direct
financial support, improved infrastructure and technology transfer,
and through manpower development. Thus it is expected to help LDC's
achieve economic-independence and bridge the gap between North and
South while making redemption for the exploitation of the South by
the North. In reality, however, aid has a more political tinge. It
often functions more for donors' purposes and needs rather than those
of recipients.
For Pacific islands states, most of which have poor natural
resources, aid plays a significant role in supporting their
economies, perhaps more so than in other countries. Aid is the main
financial resource of these formerly self-sufficient islands and they
receive the highest aid per capita of any region in the world.
Japanese aid began from the postwar reparation in the 19505.
Since then nearly 40 years have passed. Although it may be said that
Japan has a long history as an aid donor, most of Japan's aid has
been disproportionately extended to Asia. In other words, areas
Hhich do not directly serve the national interest of Japan, such as
the Pacific island states. have been neglected. As Japan is heavily
dependent on the import of natural resources from Asia, the
procurement of the resources and the stability of the Asia region are
of vital importance for Japanese economic life.
Japanese aid to Pacific island states began during the last
several years concomitant with the establishment of 200-mile
exclusive economic zones. It is a rather "new experience" for
Japan. Although thf3 "Pacific Basin Cooperation Concept" and such
catchy phrases as the "Dawn of the Pacific Age" have been much
discussed, the country's aid to the region has been limited, though
slowly increasing. While 70% of total Japanese Official Development
Assistance (GDA) goes to Asia, less than one percent is extended to
the Pacific region. Japanese aid to the region can be summed up in
the following three characteristics. The amount of aid is small, the
fisheries sector comprises the biggest proportion, and the principles
of aid policy to the region were not established until recently.
On one hand, Japanese aid is largely appreciated by island
governments. On the other hand, it is often subjected to critical
comment in the mass media for its deficiency in amount, unsuitable
content, strict conditions and links with Japanese commercial
interests such as "quid pro quo" plays for fishing rights.
Under such circumstances, it seems worthwhile to examine overall
Japanese official aid to the region, explore the surrounding problems
and suggest some options. The paper is composed of four chapters:
the first chapter takes up Japanese aid in general. It attempts to
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disclose the broad aspects of Japanese ODA worldwide, exploring its
history, principles, amount, contents, geographical distribution and
implementation mechanisms.
The second chapter examines aid to the region through the
analysis of its amounts and forms and then considers the cases of
individual recipients. Also studied is the aid by other bilateral
donors for comparison and Japanese contributions through
multilateral institutions, focusing on the Asian Development Bank.
Japanese trade with the region is investigated since trade is another
important means of economic cooperation which promotes LDC's overseas
exports and industrial development. Then surveyed are the "Pacific
Basin Cooperation Concept" and technical cooperation. The former
seems to be increasingly defining the framework of Japanese aid
policy to the region, and the latter seems to carry increasing weight
in the formulation of the policy to the region.
The third chapter features some case studies of Japanese aid.
In the summer of 1985, the author conducted field work on Japanese
aid in Fiji, Western Samoa and Tonga. Based on interviews made
during the field work as well as collected data, the chapter features
two topics. The first section takes a look at fisheries development
aid, the biggest Japanese aid to the region, and probes attendant
problems, and assesses the results. The second section examines two
projects from the viewpoint of manpower development and technology
transfer. It focuses particulary on the construction of the Fiji
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Nursing School, the largest Japanese grant aid project ever made in
the region,
The last chapter, the conclusion. reviews and discusses overall
Japanese aid principles and policy, assesses Japanese aDA to the
region, probes its prospects and makes some recommendations.
Emphasis is made in the paper on manpower development and technical
cooperation, which the author considers the most important forces in
promoting the total development of coun'tries not only in the terms of
economy but also in the terms of social and human development.
I. JAPANESE OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT AID
Historical B3ckgro~nd
Japanese aid stems from the postHar reparations to Southeast
Asia in the 19505. The San Francisco Peace Treaty concluded in 1951
determined the framework of postwar Japanese international relations,
and hence Japanese aid. In the midst of heated argument on whether
to conclude an overall peace or a separate peace, the government
selected the latter, the peace with the Western block. Article 14 of
the treaty stip~lates that Japan should make reparations to the
Allies for damages resulting from World War II (Samejima. 1982. p8).
Such reparations to Southeast Asia provided Japan with a foothold to
rehabilitate its own economy. While redeeming Japan's war deeds and
establishing economic cooperation with these countries through
reparations, Japan promoted its own exports and developed its markets
in the region. Thus, Japanese policy on economic cooperation was
formed at this stage with its own economic interest in mind and with
Southeast Asia as the geographical focus.
In the 1950s the Third World Powers emerged as international
actors in their own right. This emergence was demonstrated in the
"Bandung Spirit" at the Asia and Africa Conference in 1955. This
changed the balance of power alliances from a U.S.-Soviet
bipolarization to multipolarization. Under such circumstances. aid
Io JAPANESE OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT AID
Historical Background
Japanese aid stems from the postwar reparations to Southeast
Asia in the 1950s. The San Francisco Peace Treaty concluded in 1951
determined the framework of postwar Japanese international relations,
and hence Japanese aid. In the midst of heated argument on whether
to conclude an overall peace or a separate peace, the government
selected the latter, the peace with the Western block. Article 14 of
the treaty stipylates that Japan should make reparations to the
Allies for damages resulting from World War II (Samejima. 1982. p8).
Such reparations to Southeast Asia provided Japan with a foothold to
rehabilitate its own economy. While redeeming Japan's war deeds and
establishing economic cooperation with these countries through
reparations, Japan promoted its own exports and developed its markets
in the region. Thus, Japanese policy on economic cooperation was
formed at this stage with its own economic interest in mind and with
Southeast Asia as the geographical focus.
In the 1950s the Third World Powers emerged as international
actors in their own right. This emergence was demonstrated in the
"Bandung Spirit" at the Asia and Africa Conference in 1955. This
changed the balance of power alliances from a U.S.-Soviet
bipolarization to multipolarization. Under such circumstances, aid
became a new political strategy for both Western and Eastern
countries.
In the early 1960s, various aid agencies and international
organizations such as the International Development Assoication (IDA)
and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
were established. The purpose of such organizations was to deal with
the development of the Third world and multilateral aid. In the
United States, unde~ President Kennedy's initiative, the Agency for
International Development (AID) was formed in 1961. In the same
year, the United Nations Development Decade set out by his proposal.
The UN decade program set a quantitative target of a 5% annual
increase of GNP in developing countries. The United Nations
conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) was also organized in
1964 and made a decision that advanced nations should provide one
percent of their national income to developing countries. Thus, the
North-South problem became a global issue (Henriot. 1976. pp7-8. &
Samejima. 1982. pp12-13).
On the other hand, Japan, which gained its export market to
Southeast Asia through war reparations, was achieving high economic
growth. Commenting on the Japanese "strategy" of using reparations
to rebuild its economy, S.Samejima in his report, Nihon no Taigai
Enjo Seisaku, mentions the example of the first yen loan to India in
1958. This loan convinced India to abandon its reparation claim.
The aid was to obtain iron needed by the Japanese steel industry to
increase production. The amount of Japanese reparation paid to
burma, the l-'hilipP1Iles, Indonesia cmd South Vietnam in the l~t,Us
totaled $1012 million (Samejima. 1982. pi1).
In the 1960s, the appropriation of aid promoted Japanese exports
and economic growth. Its economic growth rate rose from 11.6% in
1966 to 13.8% in 1968. Japanese grants to Southeast Asia in the
1960s, including Burma and Korea, reached a total of $463.34 million
(ibid. pp11,15). Concomitant with U.S. intervention in the Vietnam
War, Japanese aid was extended to Indochina to enhance the stability
of the region. The Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF), the
agency dealing with overseas loans, was founded in 1961. Japan also
became a member_of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of OECD
at the start of the same year.
The devaluation of the US dollar and the oil crisis in the early
1970s were blows to the Japanese economy. They were called "Nixon
Shock" and "Doru Shock." These shocks affected the form of Japanese
aid. Although about 90% of Japanese aid had been extended to
Southeast Asia in the 1960s, after the oil crises it was
geographically spread on a more global level, especially to oil
producing countries in the Middle East. Also, a number of large
national projects such as the Iran-Japan petrochemical complex were
formed to procure oil resources. While other advanced nations
suffered from a long period of stagflation following the oil crises,
Japan quickly recovered in the late 1970s. The revaluation of yen
affected Japanese exports but reduced the cost of oil procurement,
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and Japanese trade surplus reached over $24 billion in 1978
(Samejima. 1982. pp15-24).
Under such increasing trade surplus and international pressure,
Japan was obliged to make overall improvement in its aid,
quantitatively and qualitatively. Japan set out in a three-year plan
to double its aDA and to increase the percentage of grants and untied
aid. Also, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) was
founded to improve technical cooperation in 1974. While other
countries seemed to be reluctant to expand aid because of their
depressed economic circumstances, Japan continued its increases.
Japanese aDA rose from $458 million in 1970 to $1104.9 million in
1976, $1424.4 million in 1977, $2215.4 million in 1978, $3353 million
in 1980 and $3761 million in 1983 (See Table II-I). The Japanese
plan to double aDA from 1978 has been completed and a 5-year doubling
plan since 1981 has achieved 97.7% of target. According to the 1985
budget bill of general account as passed by the Japanese Government,
the aDA budget shows the highest increase among all items, 7.8%
exceeding the second highest, the national defense budget (Mainich.
Dec.30 1984).
Since the late 1970s, however, Japanese aid policy has tended to
have a more political tinge as a result of U.S. pressure and
international tensions. Increases in aid to such countries as
Thailand and Pakistan after the Vietnam aggression in Cambodia and
that of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in 1979 are evidence of such
politicization (Samejima. 1982. pp29-30). The tendency to focus more
on the East-West problem rather than the North-South problem seems to
be increasing in the 19805 under the political alignment of Japanese
Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone and U.S. President Ronald Reagan.
The next section examines the principles of Japanese aid, which
were framed with the above history as a background.
Aid Principles
Keizai Kyoryoku no Rinen, compiled by the Economic Cooperation
Bureau of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1981, defines
the principles of Japanese aid as follows. First, aid is the cost
Japan has to pay as a peaceful nation for its security. Second, it
is the cost Japan has to pay as an economic superpower, whose
influence over the world's economy and that of developing countries
in particular, is great. Third, it is cost of the external
dependency of Japanese economy, especially for natural resources.
And fourth, it is the role Japan should playas the non-Western
nation which has experienced modernization (Gaimusho. Keizai. 1981.
pp75-84). Although there are other official reports on Japan's
foreign aid by other sources like the Ministry of International Trade
and Industry (MITI), these are thought to be the guiding principles
for Japanese aid.
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It may be worthwhile examine the above points further to analyze
Japanese aid policy and its characteristics. Apart from the
internationally accepted aid principles (humanitarian reasons and the
interdependency of the world) the report claims that Japan has
stronger reasons to promote aid from the above points. Concerning
the first point, as Japan has abandoned war-making it cannot make
direct military contributions for international peace. Because of
the international criticism that Japan has not made enough of a
contribution to international security, Japan should make further
effort to establish a peaceful and stable international environment.
Through aid, Japan can contribute to the solution of the North-South
problem, which holds one of the keys to world detente (ibid. pp76-
78).
Second, Japan's GNP $836.2 billion in 1978, is placed third in
the world following the United States and the Soviet Union.
According to OECD's Interfutures report, Japan's GDP per capita is
predicted to be the world's highest exceeding the U.S. in the year
2000. On the other hand, Japan's economic growth has been promoted
through initiatives of the private sector. Japan's bilateral aid
totaled about $10.8 billion between 1960-1979 while direct investment
and export credits by the private sectors to developing countries was
three times higher, $33.5 billion in the same period. Some 57% of
private investment and 75% of export credits went to developing
countries in 1980. Under such circumstances, Japanese economic
activities receive considerable international attention and are often
the subject of scorn.
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It is often said that Japan has an economic
overpresence" in developing countries. Aid can contribute to
reducing such economic friction and create better relationships with
developing nations by contributing to their economic development with
the transfer of Japanese technology (ibid. pp78-80).
Third, the external dependency of the Japanese economy,
especially for natural resources, is very high. Japan's import of
natural resources in 1978 was 73.3% of its total imports. Also,
53.6% of Japan's total imports came from developing countries and
47.6% of its exports in the same year went to these countries.
Therefore, the stability of developing nations and the maintenance of
friendly relationships are indispensable for the Japanese economy_
Aid can play an important role in covering Japan's external
dependence vulnerability by contributing to the economic stability of
these nations (ibid. pp80-82).
Fourth, Japan as a non-Western country has achieved rapid
modernization and industrialization in less than 100 years. Japan is
regarded by many developing countries as a model and they are eager
to learn of its experience and process of modernization. In this
sense, Japan can respond to their expectations by assisting their
development through aid (ibid. pp82-83).
From the above points, what can be concluded is that Japanese
aid is the "cost" Japan has to pay for its total security, including
military security and the procurement of energy, natural resources
and food supply vital to her role in maintaining international
urder.
L:
As these Japanese aid principles will be commented on in the
conclusion. the paper delves into the next section, which covers into
the amounts, forms. and geographical distribution of Japanese aid.
fmounts. Forms and Geographical Distribution
Japan's economic cooperation is classified into four categories:
Official Development Assistance (ODA) comprised of grant aid, 1,2 yen
loans, technical cooperation and contributions to multilateral
organizations; O~her Official Flows (OOF) consisting of financial
resources provided by the Export-Import Bank of Japan and other
government agencies as export credits and direct investments; Private
Flows (PF) including export credits, direct investment and other
capital flows financed by the private sector; and voluntary aid by
non-governmental, nonprofit organizations (APle. A Guide. 1984. p5).
ODA totaled $3761 million in 1983; OOF amounted to $1954 million
in the same year; PF accounted for $2918 million; and voluntary aid
was $30 million (See Table 11-2). The ratio of total official aid
flows to private flows is roughly two to one. Although voluntary aid
has been gradually increasing, it remains minor. about 0.7% of ODA.
This is partly because there is not much tradition of charity by
religious organizations in Japan and partly because the interest of
the Japanese people in aid in general remains very low.
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In quantity, Japanese aid has been favorably increasing, while
the rate of increase other countries has tended to be slowing or
decreasing. Japanese official aid in 1983, $3761 million, takes
third place among 17 Development Assistance Committee (DAC) member
countries of OECD exceeding Germany (See Table 11-2). By comparison,
it is four times more than the average amount between 1972-1974 of
$916 million. Its ratio to GNP, 0.33%, has reached its highest level
thus far but has still not attained the international target of 0.7%
and ranks 9th place among the members (The average ratio between 1972-
1974 was 0.24%). There is, however, a lot of scope to improve its
quality. Both the grant share of ODA 55.2% and grant element of the
total ODA, 79.5%, rank next to the lowest (in 1978 the grant share
was 48.1% and the grant element was 75.0%). The reason for the low
Japanese grant element is due to the low grant share among capital
flows as the share of loans in total ODA is high. Japan has been
trying to improve its ratio of untied aid against the opposition of
the Japanese industrial circles and this share of total aDA has risen
to 69.9%, 6th among the members (in 1978, the untied ratio was
40.3%). Bilateral aid totaled $2425 million, 64.4% of the total ODA,
and multilateral aid, $1336 million, or 35.5%. Contributions to
multilateral organizations, the total amount of which is next to the
United States, has increased if compared with average donations
between 1972-1974 when the bilateral aid was 77.2%, and multilateral,
22.7% (See Table 11-1,2,3,4).
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In geographical focus, ,Japanese aid extends from Asia to the
Middle East, Africa and Latin America. But Asia, especially
Southeast Asia, has always been the biggest recipient of Japanese aid
because of its geopolitical, historical and economic ties. Asia has
been receiving a relatively constant 70% of Japan's total bilateral
aid although it was more than 90% until 1970. The major recipients
are Indonesia, Korea, Bangladesh, Burma, Thailand, the Philippines
and China3 . Indonesia, however, has been traditionally the biggest
recipient. This is because Indonesia is regarded by the Japanese
political and economic world as the key to the stability of Southeast
Asia and also because of its rich natural resources and large
Japanese investment. In 1982, Asia comprised 68.6% of total Japanese
ODA and next, Africa, 11.3%. Although the Africa share was
previously very small, after the late 1970s it has been increasing
mainly for humanitarian reasons. 4 The third, the Middle East shared
8.2% and Latin America, 7.8%, and Oceania one percent in the same
year (Gaimusho. Data).
The contribution to LLDC countries remains very small, 18.3% of
total ODA in 1983, though that to other low income countries (LIC)
comprised 52.1% in the same year (See Table 11-9). This is because
most of the LLDCs are in Africa. Among LLDCs, Bangladesh is the
biggest recipient and Nepal is next. Although Western Samoa, the
only LLDC in Oceania, received $3.85 million in 1981. But this is
reported by the mass media as a "quid pro quo" type of aid in return
for licensed fishing in the 200 nautical mile ~one.
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As Japanese aid has been expanding, its forms and sectors have
become complicated ranging from small scale program of $10,000 to
large national projects which exceed over one billion dollars. In
1983, project aid comprised about 88.6% of the Japanese total
bilateral aid (See Table 11-5). In sectoral allocation, the
development of public utilities, that is to say, infrastructural
development for industry, shares the largest portion and amounted
53.5% of bilateral aid in 1983. Next, mining industry construction
comprised 13.4%, agriculture, forestry and fishery development,
11.6%, education, 6.9%, social infrastructure and welfare, 4.2% and
Health, 4.1% (ba~ed on Table 11-5).
Although the proportion of technical cooperation has been
gradually increasing, its share of total aDA still remains low in
comparison with other countries (See Table 11-6). In 1983, it
comprised 10.2% of the total Japanese aDA (it was 4.7% in 1970 and
8.4% in 1980) (based on data of DAC). The Japanese Government, which
regards manpower the base for nation building, is eager to promote
technical cooperation. The number of students and trainees sent to
Japan has increased to 12,394, three times than that of 1970, and
experts and volunteers sent to developing countries totaled 11,094,
four times than that of 1970. They both rank second place among the
DAC members (See Table 11-7,8).
According to feizai Kyoryoku no Rinen, the sectors besides
technical cooperation on which emphasis should be put are increasing
food production to solve the food shortage problem; the development
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of new and renewable energy sources; and infrastructure development
for public facilities and industries which promote public benefit.
The report also claims that Japan should promote its aid to Asia if
East Asia will be the center of the world economy in the 21st century
and a prime mover the world economy as the Interfutures report by
GEeD forecasts (Gaimusho. Keizai. 1981. pp88-93).
Implementation Mechanisms
The Japanese aid bureaucracy consists of three ministries and
one agency: Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
International Trade and Industry (MIT!), and the Economic Planning
Agency. The Ministry of Finance controls more than 70% of the aDA
budget including financing multilateral organizations, and lending
through the Japanese Export and Import Bank and the Overseas Economic
Cooperation Fund. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs administers more
than 20% of the aDA budget including most of bilateral grants and
technical cooperation through the Japan International Cooperation
Agency (JICA). While the Ministry of Foreign Affairs tries to use
aid as a means of Japanese diplomacy, MITI deals with aid in relation
to Japanese economic and industrial policies. Consequently, aid
policies have been made in the midst of ministry sectionalism with
its conflicts and compromises (Samejima. 1982. pl07).
1 'I
The mechanism of Japanese aid implementation is formal and
complex, requiring numerous steps and several years from the receipt
of an assistance request to the evaluation of aid effects. The
developing country request is made through diplomatic channels; the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs studies it and if found appropriate, a
survey team is sent out and aid policy is formulated. While
consulting with the Ministry of Finance about the budget, the Foreign
Ministry negotiates. with the government of the recipient country
through the Japanese embassy. After the aid budget is approved, an
Exchange of Notes (E/N) is made. Then, it goes on through the
standard procedu~es including contract for project implementation,
disbursement, and evaluation of aid effects (APle. A Guide. 1984.
pp13-17).
Although this request-based procedure has been customarily
established, there are problems. For one thing, developing countries
often request more aid than they have capacity to absorb. For
another, prior to the request from developing countries, project
initiatives have already been taken by Japanese enterprises, or an
"aid promise" has been previously made by Japanese politicians with
recipient governments. For fear of promis~ng projects being taken by
\ ther countries, MITI, Japanese companies and some technical experts
advocate the "proposal method": sending out project-finding teams
directly to developing countries without waiting for a request to
arrive. On the other hand, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which
regards the negotiations through diplomatic channels important, is
18
considering the "menu method": Japanese experts identify and
formulate proper projects for developing countries and the countries
select the ones which suits their development plan and funding
capacity (Samejima. 1982. ppl14-115).
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II. JAPANESE OFFICIAL DEVELOPHENT AID TO PACIFIC ISLAND STATES
Amounts and Forms of Japanese Aid to the Pacific
Aid is one of the biggest contemporary issues for the Pacific
island states. The purpose of aid is, in general, to help a country
achieve true independence. It is regarded to be indispensable for
the development of the islands. In reality, however, foreign aid
seems to make the islands more and more dependent. These islands,
which were formerly self-sufficient, are now heavily dependent on
foreign aid without which they appear unable to sustain their
economy. Together with remittances sent from extended families
overseas, aid is the main financial source of many of the islands.
When one takes a look at the prospects for economic advancement
of the island states, those which have the greatest development
potential are Melanesian countries such as Papua New Guinea, the
Solomon Islands and Vanuatu. They are continental islands and have
richer natural resources and bigger land areas than other islands.
Fiji, which is geographically included in Melanesia, also has
resources and land scale comparable to the above islands, and is the
most advanced in terms of economy and industry among the islands.
Most of Polynesian countries, such as Western Samoa, Tonga and the
Cook Islands, have poor resources and smaller land areas. Although
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they have adequate resources to sustain their subsistence lifestyle,
the potentiality of development is limited. The atolls, such as
Micronesian islands of U.S.T.T.P.I. and Kiribati and the Polynesian
islands of Tuvalu, have the poorest resources and smallest land
areas. Especially in the latter two countries. the population
pressure is increasingly a serious problem.
According to E.K. Fisk, the aid dependency of Pacific islands
states is so great that most of them have no option but either
"permanent dependence on aid," or "a substantial reduction of
incomes" (without aid). In the latter case, they cannot avoid a drop
in the present level of living standard. He says the
aforementioned Melanesian countries have "the best prospects for the
use of aid as a means of attaining economic independence." Fiji has
"a favorable objective for aid and investment" but there is the
danger of the flow of aid dependency and foreign investment. On the
other hand, the above-listed Polynesian countries are "in imminent
danger of permanent dependency on aid" and migration is "a
significant feature of their adjustment." About the small atoll
countries, he states that they have no option but permanent
dependence on aid and "migration in large scale is a conceivable
solution if they can find a suitable host country" (Fisk. 1982. pp33-
35).
Although Fisk seems to oversimplify, aid indeed plays a
substantial role in sustaining government revenue and development
expenditure of the islands (See Table 111-10). The aid received by
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the countries in the region i~ small in absolute terms in comparison
with that in other areas. However, they receive the most aid per
capita of any region in the world (Jackson. 1984. p167). Aid per
capita in American Samoa, French Polynesia, New Calenonia, Niue and
Tokelau, and the U.S. Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands
(T.T.P.I.) in 1980 exceeded over $900 per capita (See Table 111-11).
A large proportion of local government budgets is now supported by
aid: Papua New Guinea receives 30 percent of its government revenue
from Australia (Jackson. 1984. p146). The combined national income
of the Pacific states totals only about $6 billion, of which Papua
New Guinea has about one-third. Most of their national incomes per
capita amount to several hundred dollars. Those having a high
national income per capita of over $3000 are American Samoa, French
Polynesia, Guam, Nauru and New Caledonia (See Table 111-12). But
they are supported by heavy subsidies from France and the United
States supplementing income earned from their main industries.
Nauru, which has a national per capita income of $9091, is the
exception owing to phosphate mining. Fiji, which has gross national
income per capita of $1698 in 1981 (See Table 111-12), is the only
country which is relatively economically independent, owing to its
sugar industries. However, the non-monetary sector comprises a
large part of the subsistence economy in Pacific islands, and these
national income figures can be said to understate their total
economies.
In 1980. total aid appropriated to the region amounted to about
$1069 million. Out of it, about 5 % came from the multilateral
organizations, the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the European
Economic Community (EEC) and the United Nations Development Program
(UNDP) (based on data in SPC. 1981. p25). Apart from these
multilateral organizations, most of the major donors are former
colonial powers (except for France and the United States which have
not relinquished their territories).
Unlike Britain, Australia, New Zealand, France and the United
States, Japan does not really have a long historical and political
relationship with the Pacific island states. The only exception is
Micronesia, which Japan administered as its mandated territory in the
prewar time while successfully promoting economic and industrial
development.
As has been mentioned, Japanese aid to the region can be
characterized by the following points. Firstly, the amount of aid is
very limited. Secondly, the main focus is always fisheries
projects. Thirdly, it has been granted on an ad hoc basis, as the
principles of aid policy to the region had not been established until
recently.
When Japanese aid to the Pacific islands is discussed, it is
clear that the region does not fall within the criteria for Japanese
aid delivery. As examined in the previous sections, the region does
not meet the condiGions of Japanese aid principles and
characteristics. It is not directly connected with Japan's security,
nor does it have a market large enough to attract the investment of
the Japanese private sector. It also does not provide important
natural resources needed by Japan except for fish and certain other
resources.
Under such circumstances, Japanese aid to the region has been
limited and sporadic. The earliest data available on Japanese aid to
the region indicates that only $230,000, about 0.04% of total
Japanese aid in 1972, was allocated to the region, and the next year,
$2.56 million, about 0.3% of the whole (Gaimusho. Statistical Data).
From the late 1970s, however, the 200-mile exclusive economic zone
has become a major international issue. Japan, which had been using
the fishing grounds of the Pacific, was thus obliged to pay attention
to the region. Also, the ocean dumping of nuclear wastes issue, the
rising interest in the "Pacific Age" and the international concern
for the North-South problem all in all made Japan consider the region
as the subject of aid concern.
For such reasons, Japanese aid to the Pacific islands nations
has started with the elements of "quid pro quo. The amount of aDA
to the region was $4.64 million, or about 0.3% of the total Japanese
aDA in 1978; rose to $13.60 million, about 0.7%, in 1979; $11.58
million, 0.6%, in 1980; $19.42 million, 0.9%, in 1981; and $22.63
million, 1.0%, in 1982 (ibid.). In 1981, bilateral aid received by
the region from DAC countries including Australia, France, United
States, Britain, New Zealand and Japan totaled $900.60 million. Of
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it, Japanese ODA of $19.42 million ranked sixth, comprising only 2.1%
of total bilateral aid to the region (See Table 111-13).
Among the Pacific islands, the recipients of Japanese aid are
Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Western Samoa, Tonga, Solomons, Kiribati,
Tuvalu, Vanuatu and the U.S. Trust Territories--Palau, the Federated
States of Micronesia (FSM) and the Marshalls. In 1982, the biggest
recipient was Papua New Guinea. which received $3.69 million, about
16.3% of the total of $22.63 million extended from Japan to the
region. Other major recipients in the same year were Western Samoa,
which received $3.48 million, about 15.3%; Fiji, $3.21 million, or
14.1%; the Solomons Islands, $3.16 million, 13.9%; and Kiribati,
$1.92 million, 8.4%. The U.S.T.T.P.I. received in total $4.28
million about 18.9% (See Table 111-14).5 In accordance with
principle, Japan does not extend aid to international or regional
organizations of which Japan is not a member. Therefore, the Pacific
regional organizations such as the South Pacific Bureau for Economic
Cooperation (SPEC) are not counted as recipients of Japanese aid.
Except for Papua New Guinea, where loans are extended, Japanese
aid to the region is given as grants. Regarding the types of aid,
fisheries aid holds the biggest allocation because of both donors'
and recipients' interests and Japan's ample experience and technical
knowledge. Among a total of 55 grant aid projects handled in the
region through March, 1984, fisheries aid accounted for 20, about 36%
of the whole; second is general grant aid, which numbers 17, about
25
30% (this covers medical care, public health, education, agriculture,
and communications and transportation); others are, in order, aid for
cultural activities (10, 18%), disaster relief aid (3, 5.4%), aid for
increased food production (3, 5.4%), and food aid (2, 3.6%).
Technical cooperation, which totaled $6.85 million in 1982,
shared about 30% of the $22.63 million Japanese aDA extended to the
region in the same year (Gaimusho. Statistical Data). As explained
before, the share of technical cooperation in Japanese aDA is
generally low, about 10%. In this sense, the proportion of technical
cooperation allocated to the region is higher than other regions.
This shows Japanese eagerness for cultivating manpower in the region.
Japanese Aid to the Pacific by Country
Tables I (A-K) show in detail Japanese aid by major recipients
of the region. The countries are Fiji, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon
Islands, Western Samoa, Tonga, Kiribati, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, the
Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), Palau and the Marshalls
Islands. As shown in these data, Japanese aid to the Pacific island
nations centers on the field Japan takes an interest in, that is to
say, fisheries development, and aid to other sector~ is sporadically
extended at the request of recipients. As Japanese aid to the region
began in just the late 1970s, its principles and basic policy have
yet to be established.
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It has been carried out on an ad hoc basis
without a definitive perspective on the future of the region.
Fiji is geographically situated in the center of the Pacific
region and culturally stands on the crossroads of Polynesia and
Melanesia. Together with Papua New Guinea the country has been
playing a major role in the politico-economic spheres of the region.
Especially, its contribution to regionalism is significant. Its
primary exports are sugar, fishing, gold and copra. Tourism is also
a major industry but sugar is the biggest export earning product (60%
of all the exports) (Pacific Islands Year Boo~. 1984. p87). Indians,
who support the industry as cane growers, also control the country's
business and commerce.
Fiji is the least dependent on aid among the islands. Its
foreign aid comprised 3% of national income and 8% of government
expenditure in 1982 (See Table 111-10). Since 1979, Australia has
been the biggest donor to Fiji, while aid from Britain, its former
colonial power, has been decreasing. In 1982, Australia extended
$15.56 million, 51.9% of total Fiji bilateral aid; next, Japan, $3.21
million, 10.7%; Britain, $3.14 million, 10.5%; and New Zealand, $2.95
million, 9.8% (APle. Waga. 1984. P352). Japan, which regards the
country as the geo-political center of the region, opened its embassy
in Suva in 1979, while Fiji established one in Tokyo in 1981. Japan
has been increasing aid to the country since the end of the 1970s.
It totaled 1220 million yen in grants through 1982. The projects
ranges from fisheries development to disaster relief and education.
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Also, investments have been made by the private sector in fisheries
and tourism. When Prime Minister Nakasone visited the country in
January, 1985, he promised extra aid amounting to $10 million for the
Fiji Nursing School, a fisheries terminal, and for the University of
the South Pacific (See Table I-A).
Papua New Guinea, which boasts rich natural resources, has the
greatest potential to develop economically and industrially among the
Pacific islands. Its main exports are copper ore, gold, timber, and
coffee. Copper ore held 51% of total exports in 1982 (Pacific
Islands Year Book. 1984. p336). Foreign aid supported 10% of national
income and 36% o£ government expenditure in 1981 (See Table 111-10).
Papua New Guinea's largest donor is, as expected, its former colonial
power, Australia. Australia provides 30% of PNG government budget
and the to·tal amount of aid appropriated in 1983-84 was estimated at
over A$300 million. This means that about 85% of the total aid PNG
receives comes from Australia. Other main donors are international
organizations and West Germany (Jackson. 1984. p158). In addition to
the aid, there is a large number of Australian expatriates working in
PNG, and Australia has a very strong influence on the country even
after 10 years of independence. In 1982 Australia provided $263.45
million, 95.4% of the total bilateral aid received by PNG; next, West
Germany, $4.8 million, 1.73%; and Japan at $3.69 million, 1.34%,
ranking third (APIC. Waga. 1984. P358).
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Among Pacific islands, PNG is the largest recipient of Japanese
aid. Japan offers loans commensurate with the absorption capacity of
the country and these reached 8622 million yen as of 1982. Grants
amounted to 660 million yen through 1982. As the PNG government
follows a principle of accepting only untied grants, Japan has not
extended any grants after 1978. This is probably because the
conditions of aid from Japan and other donors are not favorable in
comparison with Australian financial aid, which is untied and at the
liscretion of PNG. It is also said that the flow of Japanese goods
into the country under the name of Japanese grant aid is not
favorable to the ~nterests of the Australian commercial sector
(Oceania Institute. 1983. p202). Japan opened its embassy in Port
Moresby in 1975, while Papua New Guinea established theirs in Tokyo
in 1977. During Prime Minister Nakasone's January, 1985 visit, loan
projects were discussed including the trans-island highway between
Port Moresby and Lae, technical assistance in rice estate
development, radio communication development and the Yonki
hydroelectric power project. The relationship between Japan and PNG,
however, is expected to be more as trade partners rather than donor-
recipient as will be mentioned later in the trade section (See Table
I -B) .
The aid dependency of the Solomon Islands is also noteworthy.
About 12% of national income and 46% of government expenditure came
from foreign aid in 1982 (See Table 10). Britain has traditionally
been the main aid source, although decreasing in amount. In 1982
received by the Solomon islands;
32.3%; and Japan, 3.16 million,
Britain provided $11.07 million,
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50.4% of total bilateral aid
next, Australia, $.7.09 million,
14.4% (APIC. Waga. 1984. p360). As
the country has excellent fishing grounds, nearly 80% of the total
Japanese grants through 1982, 2605 million yen, have been allocated
to fishery development projects. Consequently, fisheries has rapidly
developed and become the country's largest export earner, followed by
timber and copra. Apart from ODA, direct investment by the Japanese
private sector is significant. Joint ventures have thus far been
entered in fisheries and forestry (See Table I-C).
Western Samoa, whose exports depend on agricultural crops such
as copra, cocoa and taro, is deeply dependent on aid. About 36% of
national income and 65% of government expenditure were supported by
foreign aid in 1982 (See Table 111-10). The biggest bilateral donor
to Western Samoa was, until recently, New Zealand. However,
Australia has now replaced the former colonial administrator as
leading donor. In 1982 Australia provided $5.74 million, 37.4% of
the total bilateral aid extended to Western Samoa; next Japan, $3.48
million, 22.7%; New Zealand, $3.18 million, 20.7%; and West Germany,
$1.2 million, 8.1% (APIC. Waga. 1984. P369). According to the OECD
classification, Western Samoa is categorized in the group of Least
Less Developed Countries (LLDCs), but this is the subject of argument
since the country's national income ignores its large non-monetary
economic activities. As the only LLDC country among Pacific islands,
however, Western Samoa has consistently received aid from Japan,
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totalling 297~ million yen through 1982. It is the largest recipient
of Japanese grant funds among the islands. The biggest projects have
been in fisheries development including the construction of a fish
market in 1980. Aid for education and increased food production as
well as food aid are also apparent. The Japan Overseas Cooperation
Volunteers (JOCV) also have their heaviest concentration in Western
Samoa and their contributions vary from civil engineering to public
health (See Table I-D).
Tonga, the sole Pacific island country incorporating a
monarchical system on the British model, has been promoting tourism
and fisheries. Tourism is a major income source of the country along
with copra export. Its aid dependency is lighter in comparison with
other islands, comprising 8% of national income and 18% of government
expenditure in 1981-1982 (See Table 111-10). In 1982, Australia
extended $5.96 million, 48.0% of the total bilateral aid; next New
Zealand, $2.30 million, 18.5%; Britain, $1.1 million, 9.0%, the
United States, 1.0 million, 8.1%. Japan ranks fifth donating $0.76
million with its share 6.12% (APIC. Waga. 1984. p362). Japan has
extended through 1982 a total of 1505 million yen in grants. It has
been allocated to fisheries development and education. Japanese aid
to fisheries development has been quite successful (See Table I-E).
In the case of Kiribati, 22% of its total budget was supported
by external aid in 1981 (ADB. Task. 1983. plll). In 1982 Britain
extended $9.34 million, 64.8% of the total bilateral aid; next,
Australia, $2.79 million, 19.3%; and Japan, $1.92 million, 13.3%
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(APIC. Waga. 1984. P356). Following the exhaustion of phosphate in
1979, copra and some fish products have become the only exports of
the country. Kiribati has, however, the biggest 200-mile economic
zone in the region and good fishing grounds, especially for tuna. As
British aid is decreasing and the United States has not agreed to pay
a fishing license fee in the 200-mile zone, the country has recently
sought another source of financial support and has drawn wide
attention. It now allows the Soviet Union to fish in the zone in
return for a $1.7 million license fee, which supports 10% of its
national budget (The Wall Street Journal. 1986). With regards to
Japanese aid, more than 90% of the 1267 million yen in Japanese
grants received until 1982 was directed for fisheries development.
It is reported, however, that there have been some troubles between
the two countries over fishing license fees. Also, the Japanese down-
range tracking station for rockets and satellites was established on
Christmas Island, part of the Kiribati group (See Table I-F).
Tuvalu, formerly the Ellice Islands, became independent from
Britain in 1978 and legally separated from the Gilbert Islands. The
country is totally composed of atolls and at present copra and
postage stamps are the only exports. Aid accounted for 17% of
national income and 27% of government expenditure in 1982 (See Table
111-10). In 1982, Britain appropriated $3.36 million, 61.3% of the
total bilateral aid; next Japan, 0.88 million, 16.1%; and Australia,
$0.85 million, 15.5% (APIC. Waga. 1984.P365). A total of 400 million
yen extended by Japan up until 1982 has been entirely directed for
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fisheries development. But the "Te Tautai, " the fishing boat granted
by Japan, is the subject of controversy because of its unsuitable
capacity for the islands (See Table I-G).
Vanuatu, which was the condominium of France and Britain, became
independent in 1980. The country had to totally depend on France and
Britain for its budgetary support at independence. Exports and
import duties, however, now support 70% of the budget and aid is now
largely financing its development expenditure (Pacific Islands Year
Book. 1984. p483). Overseas aid comprised 29% of national income and
48% of government expenditure in 1981 (See Table 111-10). In 1982,
France extended $9.37 million, 40.2%; next Britain, $7.56 million,
32.4%; and Australia, $4.61 million, 19.8%. While aid from the
former two colonial powers might decline in future, that from
Australia is expected to increase. Japan, which appropriated $0.87
million in the same year, ranks the fifth with its share, 3.73%
(APIC. Waga. 1984. p367). Through 1982, Japan extended a total of
210 million yen for fisheries development. Investments by the
Japanese private sector have been made in a joint fishing venture and
in tourism (See Table I-H).
Japan began extending aid to the U.S. Trust Territory of the
Pacific Islands (T.T.P.I.) (here excluding the Northern Marianas) in
1980 consistent with approaching independence. Needless to say, the
United States has been the largest donor to T.T.P.I. In 1982 the
United States allocated $157 million, 97.3% of the total bilateral
aid and next, Japan, $4.28 million, 2.65% (APIC. ~. 1984. p371).
33
Japanese grants through 1982 account for 860 million yen to FSM, 560
million yen to Palau, and 540 million yen to the Marshall Islands.
Foci vary from fisheries to Infrastructure development. The U.S.
economic assistance based on the Compact of Free Association will
support the emerging countries during the initial 15-year period in
return for military concessions granted to the United States. It is
also reported by the Japanese press that the Japanese aid and
commerce presence in the T.T.P.I, where Japanese goods are already
flooding in, will increasingly displace the U.S. economic role in the
future (See Table I-I,J,K).
Bilateral Aid by Metropolitan Donors
As shown in the previous sections, Japanese bilateral aid to the
Pacific island states is very small, $19.42 million 1n 1981, 0.9% of
the total Japanese aid in the same year, or 2.1% of the total
bilateral aid allocated by DAC members to the Pacific region (See
Table 111-13). It is instructive to compare with other donors.
In the same year, Australian aid accounted for $322.10 million,
58.8% of the total bilateral aid given by the country, or 35.8% of
bilateral aid extended to the region by DAC donors; next, France,
$316.50 million, 8.9% of its total bilateral aid, or 35.1% of aid
allocated to the region; the United States, $138.00 million, 3.2%, or
15.3%; Britain, $46.63 million, 3.5%, or 5.2%; New Zealand, $37.71
million, 74.7%, or 4.2%; and West Germany, $12.37 million, 0.6%, or
1.4% (See Table 111-13). Thus Japan, while exceeding West Germany,
ranks 6th lagging Britain and New Zealand. The aid of the top three
countries, Australia, France and the United States, is largely
appropriated to their former or present colonies: Papua New Guinea,
French Polynesia and New Caledonia, U.S. territories including Guam
and American Samoa, and the U.S. T.T.P.I. including the Northern
Marianas, respectively. For comparison, let's take a look at the aid
of these countries in more detail focusing on two major donors,
Australia and New Zealand.
The guiding aid principles of Australia, the largest bilateral
donor to the region, encompass humanitarian purposes to alleviate
poverty through development and the serving of strategic and economic
interests as well. These are the major factors that determine the
delivery of Australian aid together with recipients' needs and
Australian aid capacity. Australian aid totaled $753 million in
1983, about 0.49% of its GNP. It is all given as grants (See Table
11-2), and the untied proportion of its total aDA is 70.4% (See Table
11-4). In 1983-1984, 36% of its total aid, A$840 million, was
extended to Papua New Guinea, 25% to multilateral organizations, and
39% bilaterally to other Pacific, Asian and other developing
countries (Jackson. 1984. p47). Australian aid ranges from the
agriculture and infrastructure sectors to education and technical
training, while geographically its delivery extends from the Pacific
and Asia to Africa. But, because of their geopolitical ties with
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Australia, the major recipient,s are Papua New Guinea and the island
states of the Pacific.
Australian aid to Papua New Guinea in 1983-84 was estimated at
over A$300 million. Australia provides 30% of the PNG government
revenue. Eighty-five percent of the total aid PNG receives comes
from Australia and this inflow has a major impact on the PNG
economy. The country also enjoys special trade access to the
Australian market under the Papua New Guinea-Australia Trade and
Commercial Relations Agreement (PATCRA), while Australia benefits
from its large surplus trade balance with Papua New Guinea (Ibid.
pp145-165).
Concerning the other Pacific island states, Australian aid
totaled A$40 million in bilateral form in 1982-83, about 5.3% of
total Australian aid. Project aid forms the bulk of Australian aid
to the region, while 20% went to regional organizations in 1983-1984
(Jackson. 1984. PP177-179). Except for the U.S. and French
territories, Australian aid is extended to most of Pacific island
states and usually ranks in the top three. Apart from Papua New
Guinea, Fiji receives the highest proportion, about 5.6% of the total
Australian aid to the region in 1980 (based on data, SPC. 1981.
P25). Australia also a party to a preferential trade agreement, the
South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Agreement (SPARTECA), and
the region enjoys its benefits.
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According to R.S. Debreceny, the characteristics of New Zealand
development assistance since World War II can be summed up in the
following points. First, ODA to the region in the initial stage was
small and directed almost entirely to its territories (The Cook
Islands, Niue, and Tokelau) and Western Samoa, which was a UN Trust
Territory. Second, concomitant with the decolonization of Oceania
and the changes in its own foreign policy in shifting emphasis from
Europe and Asia to the Pacific, aid to the region has increased.
Third, private sector and voluntary agencies have been playing an
important role in development assistance in the region (Debreceny.
1984. p207).
Although the amount of New Zealand aid is not large in absolute
terms compared with other donors, New Zealand is one of the two
countries which have the highest concentration of their aDA supplied
to the region. As was previously shown, more than 70% of the
country's bilateral aid has been allocated to the region throughout
1979-1981 and Australia's case was about 60%, while those of other
countries remained several percent in the same period (See Table 111-
13). Except for the U.S. and French territories, New Zealand aid is
distributed to all island states in equitable proportions. The
highest recipient was regional organizations with a 26.3% share of
the country's total aid to the region in 1980, and the second was the
Cook Islands, with a 21% share (based on data, SPC. 1981. P25).
Assistance ranges from infrastructure projects, agriculture and
forestry to health, education, and technical cooperation including
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dispatch of experts and acceptance of students and trainees.
Emphasis is put on livestock improvement, crop production and
shipping services (ADB. Task. 1983).
In addition to such development assistance, what should not be
forgotten is that New Zealand has been accepting a large number of
immigrants from Pacific islands, mainly from Polynesia including the
Cook Islands, Western Samoa, Niue, Tokelau and Tonga. Its capital,
Auckland, is the b~ggest Polynesian town in the Pacific. For
instance, about 24,500 people from the Cook Islands and about 40,000
from Western Samoa are now living in New Zealand (Pacific Islands
Year Book. 1984. yp55,505). Remittances sent to their homes play
an important role in boosting the islands' economies. Together with
Australia, the country also provides a preferential, non-reciprocal
trade agreement, SPARTECA.
In the case of France, the second largest donor in the region,
aid almost entirely focused on its dependent territories. That is to
say, in 1980 more than 93.8% of France's total aid to the region was
extended to its dependencies, French Polynesia, New Caledonia, and
Wallis and Futuna (the last one comprises only about 2%). About 5.8%
was allocated to Vanuatu and the rest went to Papua New Guinea, Tonga
and regional institutions (based on data, SPC. 1981. P25) (ADB. 1983.
Tas1<;. p117).
Concerning the United States, 98.2% of the U.S. aid to the
region went to American Samoa, Guam and T.T.P.I. in 1980 (the last
one comprises 54.8%). The rest was appropriated to regional
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institutions, Papua New Guinea, Fiji and others (based on data, SPC.
1981.p25).
Aid from Britain was also mostly allocated to its former
dependencies. ~'hat is to say, about 97.1% was extended to Fiji,
Kiribati, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu in the same
year (the Solomons received the largest portion, about 31%) (based on
data, SPC. 1981. P25). But Britain's aid, especially budgetary
grants, has been continuously declining (ADB. 1983. Task. pl18).
Regarding West Germany, its aid allocation to the region
fluctuates but, on average, about $13.9 million was extended to the
region during 1979-1981 (See Table 111-13). Germany concentrates on
Papua New Guinea, Western Samoa, Tonga and Fiji, as the former two
were at one time its colonies. The sectoral focus is on agricultural
development, water supply and sewerage, and general construction
(ADB. 1983. Task. p116). In 1980, Tonga had highest share, about 57%
and next, Western Samoa, about 26% (based on data, SPC. 1981. p25).
Thus, most aid from donors is distributed to their former and
present colonies. That is to say, it is the cost they are paying
for past colon~al exploitation and administration. Tn this sense,
Japanese aid has been so far more evenly distributed to the island
recipients as it has no past historical, political connections with
the islands except for Micronesia. Alternatively, it can be said
that Japanese economic assistance to the region has a number of
different meanings. That is to say, it is the responsibility of an
economic superpower which shares the Pacific, or a return for its
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interests such as 200-mile exclusive economic zones, or the cost for
its present economic exploitation in the region. Compared with
Australian and New Zealand aid, however, it cannot be denied that
Japanese aid falls behind in terms of quantity and quality, and lacks
trade preferential measures as well. It is probably not fair,
however, to pass judgement on Japan's contribution to the region
based only on bilateral aid. It is also necessary to take a look at
multilateral contributions and next section delves into this subject.
Aid by Multilateral Organizations
There is much argument concerning bilateral versus multilateral
aid. The Jackson report (p47), the Australian Government report on
aid, asserts that bilateral aid provides donors with commercial
opportunities and can be more tangible to taxpayers. Bilateral aid
is apt to have political and economic strings attached, while
multilateral aid is usually regarded as free from such pressures.
But not all multilateral aid is free from political influence. Then
too, there is much said about the bureaucratic inefficiency of
international organizations. On the other hand, multilateral aid has
more capacity for the mobilization of capital intensive, long term
projects requiring technical proficiency. It is also open to
international bidding, which hopefully promotes least-cost supply of
aid financed goods and services.
40
At present five international organizations, Asian Development
Bank (ADB), World Bank (including IBRD and IDA), European Economic
Community (EEC), United Nations (including UNDP and other UN
organizations), and the International Monetary Fund (IMFJ,
appropriate aid to the region. According to the Task Force Report on
the Study of th~ Bank's Role in the South Pacific Developing Member
CQ'dfltri~9...~l'1C-el_iT!the 1980s prepared by ADB, multilateral
organizations appropriated to the region an average of $66.2 million
annually during the period of 1977-81. Their aid to the region has
increased by 32% annually during the same period. The form of aid
from these multilateral institutions is normally either grants or
concessional loans for project financing, while in case of IMF, it
consists of balance of payment supports. The EEC, which has two
resident delegations at Port Moresby and Suva, has been assisting
SPDMCs since 1976. It provides financial assistance and support of
regional exports under the Lome convention. UNDP, which has resident
representative offices in Port Moresby, Suva, and Apia, mainly
extends technical assistance grant funds for personnel, studies and
training programs (ADB. 1983. Task. pp32-33).
ADB is the biggest multilateral donor. Its average financial
flow to the region between 1977-1981 amounted to $19.0 million, about
3.8% of the total official flows to the region and about 28.7% of the
multilateral aid during the same period. The World Bank appropriated
$15.3 million, 23% of the total multilateral aid; EEC, $15.0 million,
22.6% of the total multilateral aid; UNDP, $6.6 million, 9.9%; IMF,
$5.~ million, 8.4% (Table 111-15).
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ADB's share of contributions has
been increasing from 19% in 1977 to 32% in 1981. ADB provides its
"Developing Member Countries (DMCs)" with loans and technical
assistance for economic and social development, promotes DMC capital
investment from both public and private sectors and coordinates
development policies and plans. According to the ADB's Task, the
World Bank plays less important role in the region. This is partly
because its members are limited to Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Solomon
Islands and Western Samoa, and also because the World Bank and ADB
have agreed that ADB will play the leading role in the region. Some
of World Bank's IDA fund is channeled under a co-financing
arrangement with ADB (ADB. 1983. Task. pp33,34,61). It is reported,
however, that Papua New Guinea and Fiji do not wish to be restricted
to the ADB, and have requested the World Bank to increase its
financing.
At present, out of 28 developing member countries, eight island
countries, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Western Samoa,
Tonga, Vanuatu, the Cook Islands, and Kiribati, are members of the
Asian Development Bank. The region received 2.1% of total ADB loans
in 1978-1982. On a per capita basis, however, the share to the
region is highest. It received over $8.30 per capita on an annual
average (if Papua New Guinea is excluded, $20.60) during the same
period. In comparison, other ADB recipients were granted $2.70 per
capita on an annual average during this period. Also, the Bank's
Asian Development Fund (ADF), which is extended to poorer developing
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countries on highly concessional terms, gives special consideration
to the region. Except for Fiji and Papua New Guinea, all the SPDMCs
are financed solely from the ADF even though their per capita income
is higher than other DMCs receiving ADF assistance. Papua New Guinea
receives aid flows both from the Bank's ordinary capital resources
and the ADF. Under ADB's policy for SPDMCs, special emphasis is
placed on technical assistance and the development of human
resources, which coincides with Japanese eagerness for manpower
development. SPDMCs received in 1978-1982 on average of 6.8% of
total technical assistance grants (ADB. 1983. Task. pvii).
All the met~opolitan powers of the pacific are members of ADB,
with Japan as the biggest donor. In 1983 ADB borrowed a total of
$254.5 million in the Japanese capital market, about 25.9% of the
Bank's total borrowing, while $100 million was borrowed in the U.S.
market, about 10.2% and $29.4 million in the Australian market, about
3%. Japan's contribution to the Asian Development Fund (ADF) and the
Technical Assistance Special Fund (TASF) is especially significant.
For ADF resources, Japan's contributed amount in 1983 accounted for
$1827.15 million, or 45.6% of the total, in comparison with the
United States deposit of $843.77 million, about 21%, and Australia,
$187.16 million, or 4.6%. For TASF Japan contributed about $37.1
million, about 58.5%; Australia, $2.4 million, 3.9%; and the United
States, $1.2 million, 1.9% (based on data, ADB. 1983. Annual.
pp75,80,81).
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Japan took part in the foundation of ADB from the early stages.
Japan's national interest in Asia as a trade partner and market
developed concomitant with Japan's economic development in the
1950s. Its desire for the foundation of an Asian regional
development institution overlapped the regional need and the plan of
the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) in the
1960s. Both plans were realized with international efforts and
collaboration, including that of the United States. The Asian
Development Bank was founded in 1966 in Manila and Japanese persons
have been elected as presidents of the Bank since its inception. At
the inaugural me~ting of the ADB Board of Governors held in Tokyo in
1966, the then Japanese prime minister, Eisaku Sato, expressed
Japan's enthusiasm and determination in full support of the bank. He
assured that Japan would continue to extend financial and technical
assistance to the Bank.
The United States is now more emphasizing bilateral aid and its
contribution to ADB has been consequently curtailed. However, Japan,
because of its historical and deep commitment to the ADB as well as
its relationship with Asian countries, has been playing and will
continue to playa significant role in the Bank. In this sense,
Japan can take the initiative for an increase in the Bank's
contribution to the Pacific island states. Thus, while Japan's
bilateral aid to the region is limited, it can be augmented through
this multilateral channel, especially by contributing to the Bank's
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Asian Development and Technical Assistance Special Funds, which are
of large benefit to the region.
lrade aDA-Private Investment in the Pacific
It is plausible that there are three means of economic
cooperation to developing countries. One is ODA through official
channels, the other two are trade and investment through private
channels. All three are complementary and indispensable factors for
economic development of developing countries in this interdependent
world. The priority and demands on them, however, vary depending on
the needs of developing countries and the interests of developed
countries as well. If the level of economic development of a
developing country is very low, its natural resources poor, and the
priorities of their development plan are in meeting fundamental human
needs, aid would be the most essential element. The more economic
development has been progressing, however, the greater the need would
be for trade and priv2 ~ investment (Gaimusho. 1981. p9G). Except
for some islands, most of Pacific island states are considered to
fall into the former case, although their fundamental human needs
seem to be fulfilled in their so-called "subsistence affluence." To
reduce their aid dependency and help to achieve overall economic and
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industrial development, however, trade and investment should also be
promoted complementarily with aid. Especially in the case of
Melanesia, such as Fiji, Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands,
trade and investment can play significant role to push their
development.
The Jackson report emphasizes the importance of trade relations
with developing countries as follows:
Trade flows are vastly greater than aid flows, and
trade is more important than aid for donors and recipients
alike. Those developing countries that have pursued open
economic policies have achieved faster growth, fuller
employment and higher wages than those which have clung to
protection. Australia's trade with developing countries is
already far more important than aid, and progress in
Australia towards a more open economy will be more
important than aid for future relations with most
neighboring countries (Jackson, G. 1984. p12).
To explore this issue, we take a look at trade relations between
Japan and the region and with respect to other aid donors for
comparison. Japanese economic activities have been expanding in the
region and there is a heavy flow of Japanese goods. The total trade
between Japan and the region amounted to about $757.738 million in
1980, while in the same year the total aid extended to the region
amountd to $11.58 million. In the Australian case, the total trade
with the region was $854.994 million while that of aid was $314.92
million in the same year (based on the data, Table 111-13,16,17).6
Therefo~e, as the Jackson report says, trade flow is indeed much
greater than aid flow.
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The main export markets of the island states are Japan and
Europe and not Australia or New Zealand. In 1980, the amount of
exports to Japan comprised 26.0% of the total exports from the region
while France received 13.7%; the United States, 12.1%; Australia,
9.2%; Britain, 6.6%; and New Zealand, 2.0%. On the other hand, with
regards to imports to the region, Australia is the biggest supplier
comprising 26.1% of the total; next France, 13.9%; then, Japan,
11.7%; the United States, 11.0%; and New Zealand, 8.0%. In
Australia's case, it has a large surplus of $538.834 million in its
trade balance. Likewise, New Zealand, France, and the United States
had trade surplus~s. On the other hand, in the Japanese case, the
trade balance shows an excess of Japanese imports of $131.989
million. The only other country which had trade deficit is Britain
(based on data Table 111-16,17).
Thus it seems as if the region had a trade surplus with Japan.
Of exports to Japan, however, 70.4% came from Papua New Guinea and
20.8%, from New Caledonia (See Table 111-16). About 72% of exports
from Papua New Guinea to Japan was copper ore and about 86% of
exports from New Caledonia was nicl~el ore. With copper ore from
Papua New Guinea comprising about 45% of the total Japanese import
from the region and nickel ore from New Caledonia about 18%, these
two mineral items held about 63% of the total Japanese imports from
the region (Gaimusho. 1981. p80).
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These figures imply the characteristics and significance of
Japanese trade with the region. Unlike Southeast Asia, the region is
not really an attractive market for Japan. Apart from the two
commodities and a few others. the region does not present many items
which Japan would like to import. Also, as the total GNP of the
region amounts to only about $6 billion, it does not have much
economic importance to Japan. If one compares the trade flow between
Japan and the region with that between Japan and New Zealand in 1980,
the former is small.. It is about 50 % of the $1504.6 million total
trade amount between Japan and New Zealand (Gaimusho. 1981. p.79).
Except for Papua New Guinea, new Caledonia, and Nauru (from which
Japan imports of phosphate rock and ranks third), all other states
have a huge trade imbalance, an excess of imports from Japan. For
instance, in Fiji's case in 1981, its exports to Japan, $18.78
million, were merely 21.5% of its imports from Japan, $87.13
million. That is to say, Japan had trade surplus of $68.35 million
with Fiji (See Table 111-16,17). Therefore, the aid extended to
Fiji, normally around $3 million, is like a drop in a bucket vis-a-
vis its huge trade imbalance. The same thing can be said of other
states.
Trade is originally conducted based on the reciprocal interest
for both parties, exporters and importers. In reality, however, it
seems to be working for the advantage of one party over the others'.
This is especially so in the trade relationships between developed
countries and developing nations. The Economist (Nov.30/1985. pp15-
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16) reports that the increase in oil price which occurred twice in
the past decade created stagflation among advanced nations, however,
today's drop in price of raw materials now lowers their inflation and
boosts their economic growth. According to the article, the rich
countries have received $65 billion as a "gift" from poor countries
for the last year in the form of the reduction of import prices of
primary commodities. Most of the exports from Pacific island states
are primary products and the fluctuation of market prices seriously
affects their economy and industry, especially since many of them
depend on monocultural crops. What the region really needs is not
only an increase in the amount of Japanese aid and encouragement of
local industries, but also export promotion and access to Japanese
markets. When thinking of these facts, Japan should take measures
to lift import restrictions on the primary products of these Pacific
states. Japan can offer non-reciprocal, special trade preferences
like the Lome Convention of EEC, or SPARTECA and PATCRA which
Australia and New Zealand provide to the region. If the island
states can have more access to the Japanese market, they can promote
more exports, which encourages the increase in their productivity and
industries and leads overall economic development.
The other means of economic cooperation is through private
investment. Private investment is also usually realized when the
interest and merits between investors and investment country
reciprocally meet. Like trade, the region is not really an
attractive investment marl~et for Japan as the natural resources of
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the region are limited. There are, however, some resources in the
fields of fisheries, tourism, timber and mineral industries which
attract Japanese investment. There have been already various
investments undertaken especially in the form of joint-ventures,
including fisheries and tourism. In fisheries, tuna canneries of
Solomon-Taiyo in the Solomon Islands and PAFCO in Fiji are examples.
Also, in Vanuatu the South Pacific Fishing Company (SPFC), a joint
venture between two Japanese trading companies, Mitsui Bussan and
Taiheiyo Suisan and the Vanuatu Government, has been operating an
export business of frozen fish to the United States, Italy and
Japan. In touris~, Japanese trading firms and resort development
companies have established hotels and resorts in a number of islands
including Fiji, Vanuatu, and Micronesia-- Palau, Guam, and Saipan.
As joint ventures will be further discussed in the fisheries aid
section of the chapter entitled Case Studies of Japanese Aid, this
section only notes the following points. On one hand, joint ventures
are welcome and give some favorable effect on island economies. It
gives an impetus to economic development of islands by increasing
exports and earning foreign currencies and creating employment
opportunities. On the other hand, however, investment by Japanese
enterprises, often backed-up by big financial powers in Japan, are
also regarded to be menaces to islands' business and natural
environment. Like trade, it seems to work more for the advantage of
investing companies and their profits rather than those of local
sides. Investment, which would create friction and competition with
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local entrepreneurs should be avoided. As the part of private
economic cooperation, Japan should invest in those fields which can
contribute to overall development of islands. That is to say,
investment should not only increase productivity, export income and
employment opportunities but also should complement local needs and
promote technical transfer and manpower development. There is also
the need for concern and appropriate measures to avoid environmental
destruction of the islands, which are considered to be vulnerable to
contamination.
Pacific Basin Cooperation Concept
Initially, Japanese aid policy for the Pacific island states was
not formed under established guidelines. The policy now seems,
however, to be increasingly defined within the conceptual framework
of Pacific basin cooperation. Therefore, it is important to examine
the concept, abstracting from ideas presented by concerned study
groups and organizations. A look is also taken at Japanese aid to
the islands in the context of donor and recipient interests.
The "Pacific Basin Cooperation Concep-t" was first proposed by
the late Japanese prime minister Masayoshi Ohira in 1978. A study
group was then formed with Saburo Okita, noted Japanese economicst,
as the charman plus representatives from four other rim countries,
the United States, Australia, Canada and New Zealand. However, ideas
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analogous to Ohira's concept had existed in Japan prior to his
proposal. For example, in the late 1960s economist Kiyoshi Kojima
proposed the Pacific Free Trade Area (PAFTA). Based on the idea of a
"Pacific Economic Community," PAFTA was supported by the then
minister of Foreign Affairs, Takeo Hiki (Kojima. 1980. pp2-7). Also,
various Japanese groups and international organizations, representing
the academic, political and business spheres, conduct research and
conferences on the possibilities of founding a Pacific community.
Among them, the Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC), formed of
Japanese business leaders and their counterparts in the private
sector of other basin countries, is the most noted and probably the
most active.
The primary aim of the concept is to establish a Pacific
economic community analogous to the European Economic Community
(EEC) . The EEC is composed of countries which are more or less
uniformly industrialized, have a similar standard of living, and
share a common Western culture. On the other hand, the Pacific
countries are more diversified in historical, cultural, political,
economic and industrial context. They range from advanced nations in
the Pacific rim to newly industrialized countries (NICs) in Asia and
Latin America, developing countries in Asia and Oceania, and least
less developed countries (LLDC) in some islands. Therefore, there
are immeasurable difficulties to surmount, and it is hard to conceive
a picture of a Pacific community.
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According to Alan K. Henrikson, an American professor of
diplomatic history, the use of the metaphor "basin" is an indication
of the willingness to shape and crystallize the concept of the
Pacific, which has been conventionally regarded as simply the world's
biggest ocean. It is necessary that people in the Pacific have the
fee1ing that t.hey belong to a common community (The Wi1son Center.
1979. p56).
The basic idea of the community, at least seen in common in
Japanese circles, has the community as the center of the world, and
based on peace and co-prosperity rather than military factors. It
envisages Pacifi~ development in a long-term perspective of deepening
regional interdependency and complementarity. Not a closed
membership but an open community, the emphasis is placed on economic
relations rather than political ones. The concept considers the
North-South problem in the Pacific as the important issue to solve.
Professor and economist Tsuneo Iida thinks that most of the
region's developing countries are not radicals but are taking the
course of moderation, while the advanced nations are possessed of
youth and vigor. Thus the area may be a test case for the solution
of the North-South problem. In this sense, Japan, with its economic
power and commensurate with its international position, can play an
active role in the founding of a Pacific community. (PBEC. July.
1981).
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At present the concept exists only in outline form. and the
major points can be summarized as follows: l)promotion of mutual
understanding through education and cultural exchange, 2)promotion of
regional study, 3)development of human resources and technical
cooperation, 4) cooperation and trade promotion and the coordination
of industries, 5)cooperation in resource development including
energy, agriculture, forestry, fishery and the ocean, 6)provision of
smooth capital flows in financial markets, 7)development of
transportation systems and satellite communication networks.
The primary bond which connects these Pacific countries is
economic interrelations. Enhancing economic interdependency and
correcting the economic deficiencies of developing countries are
thought important in levering up the overall economy of the region.
For these reasons, increases in aid, joint venture investment with
non-equity arrangements between advanced nations and developing
countries, and special trade preferences as opposed to zero tariffs,
are considered for developing countries. For instance, Kojima
proposes that aDA be pooled and used multilaterally in no-strings
fashion through the creation of "revolving aid fund." With regards
to the fund, he asserts two principles: first, the fund should be
"completely unfettered so far as procurements are concerned" and
secondly, "any positive imbalance between a country's sales under aid
procurements and its aid commitment should be held with the fund"
(Kojima, K. 1980. p15-16). Within the community, both Okita and
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Kojima maintoin the importance of special trade preferences for the
so-called "basket cases.
Noboru Goto, a noted Japanese business leader and the chairman
of the PBEC Japan committee, states that economic cooperation has
passed the stage where merely money is appropriated to developing
countries. Instead, it has reached a stage where technical transfers
through joint ventures to the NICs and developing countries are
appropriate for upgrading overall industries in the region (Taiheiyo
Gakkai, 1984. p57).
The Pacific basin cooperation concept really centers on
advanced, rim cou~tries as the leading members with the so-called
middle powers in Asia as the secondary members. The Pacific island
states are place at the margin. While economic relationships with
ASEAN countries are regarded as important, Pacific island states
situated inside the basin are not viewed as equal partners for
economic activities. They are considered as recipients of aid.
What is regarded as most important for Japanese aid to the region is
the development of human resources and technical cooperation so as to
promote the standard of technical knowledge and skills in the region.
(This is included in No.3 of the seven key points of the concept
above mentioned.) The island states' significance is defined with
respect to the 200 mile exclusive economic zones, representing
fishery grounds as well as potential mineral resources.
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As to the islands' view of a future Pacific basin entity, Prime
Minister Ratu Kamisese Mara of Fiji, who attended the 14th General
Meeting of PBEC, held in Hong Kong in 1981, hoped that the "Pacific
Way" would receive due consideration in the course of overall
development of the Pacific (PBEC. July. 1981). The following year,
S. Langi Kavaliku, the minister of Education of Tonga attended the
15th General Meeting of PBEC in Nagoya, Japan. He commented at the
meeting that the urgent issue for the Pacific island states, which
are limited in manpower and resources, was how to secure political
independence and improve the standard of living by economic growth
(PBEC. July. 1982). He has also remarked that the Pacific island
states consider conclusion of agreements such as the EEC Lome
convention a higher priority than the foundation of a Pacific
community (Kavaliku, Langi S. pers comm. Honolulu. June/1985).
Hopefully, the center of the basin would not fallout and the concept
would not become like a doughnut.
Japanese Technical Cooperation
According to Professor Dudley Seers of the University of Sussex,
development is a normative concept which is almost synonymous with
progress accompanied by value judgement. Traditionally, capital,
labor and resources are regarded as the three elements of economic
development in development economics (JICA. Kaihatsu. 1984. plG).
b6
Shinsuke Horiuchi. director of the planning department of the
Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), has been engaged in
economic development of developing countries for a long time.
Contrary to the above mainstream view, he believes that "technology,"
"institutions" and "resources" are the framework of economic and
social development of developing countries. Technology is dynamic
and accelerating: the more technology accumulates, the more the
technical base broadens. On the other hand, institutions are
static. They are the norms restricting individuals in a society.
Institutions are inherently rigid, but may change through the
contacts with outside institutions and technology. Some social
institutions tolerate such challenges but others do not. With
respect to resources, new technology creates new resources. When
resources are said to be limited, they are limited at a given time
and at a certain level of technology. If technical development is
infinite, then resources can be said to be infinite. Technology is a
tool to exploit materials for the use of mankind as resources.
Therefore, Horiuchi remarks that the economic adJancement of
developing countries can be taken as the process of technology
transfer in which technology introduced from advanced nations is
assimilated into society, culture and institutions (Horiuchi. 1984.
pp252-258).
Then, when discussing Japan's aid to less developed countries
(LDCs), technical cooperation is considered key to their economic
development. As explained before, however, the share of Japanese
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technical assistance of its total aDA still remains small. It
amounted to $385.1 million in 1983, about 10.2% of the total. It
ranks fourth among seven DAC member countries next to France, the
United States, and Germany (See Table 11-6). Yet, Japanese technical
aid has been improving in quantity and quality. By comparison, in
1970 it was $21.6 million, about 4.7% of the total and ranked eighth
among DAC members, and in 1980, $277.8 million, 8.4% and sixth.
Students and trainees sent to Japan numbered 12,394 in 1983, three
times more than in 1970, and experts and volunteers sent to
developing countries totaled 11,094, four times more than in 1970
(based on data, !able 11-7,8). Both these measures rank second place
among the DAC members.
The forms of Japanese technical cooperation range from accepting
students and trainees, to dispatching experts and survey teams from
JICA and volunteers from the Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteers
(JOCV), to the provision of equipment and materials, and to project-
type cooperation. The fields of the programs for both trainees and
experts include engineering, agriculture, fisheries, communications
and transportation, public health, commerce, tourism, and
administration. In the case of JOCV volunteers, which was founded in
1965 as an affiliate of JICA, agriculture, fisheries and education
are major domains. Although they are young volunteers, the level of
their technical knowledge and skills are generally higher than
volunteers from other advanced nations and are appreciated despite
their language handicap. Most Japanese sponsored technical
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cooperation is organized by JICA, and 95% of such programs are based
on a request by developing countries. The remaining are by requests
from multilateral organizations such as the United Nations Industrial
Development Organization (UNIDO) and the International Labor
Organization (ILO). Geographically, 68% of trainees come from Asia
such as Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand. While about 60% of experts
from JICA are sent to Asia, the major region JOCV volunteers are sent
to is Africa (MITI. 1984. pp251,256).
Japanese bilateral technical cooperation has also been carried
out through another channels such as private businesses, public
corporations and Feligious organizations. The number of students and
trainees on a non-governmental basis totaled 2,573 in 1983, more than
a half of the number under governmental programs. The total of
experts dispatched remains small, 136 in the same year (MITI. 1984.
pp251,258).
As has been previously explained, the Pacific island states are
the recipient of approximately one percent of total Japanese aDA. A
total of $6.85 million was extended in 1982 for aDA technical
assistance. This is about 30% of the total Japanese bilateral aDA
appropriated to the region in the same year and is 1.7% of the total
Japanese bilateral technical assistance to developing countries
(based on data, Gaimusho. 1982). Concerning personnel, 117 trainees
came from the region in 1983. This is about 2.4% of the total
trainees received from developing countries. The number of trainees
increased seven times over that of 1975 and nearly two times more
than in 1982.
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A total of 120 experts and volunteers were dispatched
to the region in 1983, about 1.7% of the total. Also, on an non-
governmental basis, 52 trainees, about 2% of the total, were accepted
by the private sector, and 5 experts, about 4.2%, were provided by
business entities in 1983 (MITI. 1984. pp250, 257). Upon noting that
the average share of Japanese technical assistance of aDA to LDCs is
about 10%, the share of technical assistance to the pacific island
region can be said to be comparatively higher than other regions.
Although Japanese technical assistance to the Pacific island
states seems to be improving and is appreciated to a certain extent,
it is not withou~criticism. It often fails to achieve efficient
results because of problems on both the donor and recipient sides.
For one thing, there are not many Japanese experts who are well
versed with foreign languages, nor those with enough working
experience overseas. They have difficulties in communicating and
instructing. For another, students and trainees are confronted with
traditional values after they return to their societies which often
contradict what they have learned through training. Therefore,
simple transfer of technology through experts and trainees as a
medium does not easily integrate into their society.
The Pacific island states mostly depend on primary industry,
mainly traditional agriculture based on a subsistence economy.
Skilled manpower is indispensable for modernizing industry to
increase their productivity and exports to the world market. For
people who are not used to working in modern industrial economies,
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however, there are difficulties in management and administration,
whether it be in fisheries, agriculture, manufacturing, or
financing. What they need are not only technical skills but also
administration skills. Some projects fail or collapse when
transferred to local people after the experts return home.
Technology transfers need follow-up and proper administration to
ensure continuity in the staffing of technical posts.
According to Horiuchi, technical cooperation brings about
changes in the social institutions of LDCs as the result of
transferring technologies which have been monopolized by advanced
nations. The sp~ed of economics and social development can be also
said to be the speed of the assimilation of technology. There is
often frustration, however, about the fact that technical knowledge
and skills do not really spread and take root among the people in
LDCs despite the great number of students or trainees and experts.
What is needed, however, is not to force changes upon institutions
ill-suited to absorb technology transfers but to introduce technology
which matches the social and environmental conditions of developing
countries. For this, there is a need to develop technology
appropriate to the recipients and this is, said Horiuchi, in a true
sense, technical cooperation with developing countries (Horiuch.
1984. pp260-262).
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III. CASE STUDIES OF JAPANESE AID TO PACIFIC ISLAND STATES
As the world's biggest fishing country, Japan emphasizes
fisheries development of the region. 7 As has been mentioned, its
fisheries aid comprises the biggest allocation, 36% of Pacific aDA in
1983. The reasons include both donor's and recipients' interests,
Japan's ample experience and fishing technology, as well as the
resultant gains to Japanese fisheries. Another reason for Japan's
inclination to fisheries is that funds are easily appropriated since
the sector has its own independent annual budget. The other sectors,
such as education, are lumped together in general grant aid with a
number of items.
To the Pacific island nations, whose resources are limited,
marine resources are of primary importance. This has been especially
so after the establishment of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).
Their fish resources are skipjack, yellowfin, albacore, big-eye--for
the tuna industry and shellfish and prawns for aquaculture. Amongst
these, the tuna industry--mainly skipjack--is the most promising
(Kataoka, C. 1984. p66).
In 1984, a total of 630,000 tonnes of tuna were caught in the
region. This comprises 35% of the world tuna catch in the same
year. About 100,000 tonnes of the regional catch were harvested by
Pacific islands and fishing boats based at ports in the region
(Doulman. 1985. pp3,7).
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TUlIa ilshing is usually conducted using
three methods: long lining, pole and lining, and purse seining. The
first method is applicable for deep sea tunas--yellowfin, albacore
and big-eye and the latter two are for skipjack, which live in
surface waters. Currently, 115 purse seiners and 700 long-liners
(ibid. p3) are reported operating in the region. The main fishing
grounds for these migratory fish, tuna, centers on the western and
central Pacific. That is to say, Micronesia (FSM, Kiribati and
Nauru) and Melanesia (Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, and
Vanuatu).
In the 195frs and 19605, deep-sea tuna fishing was conducted by
the more remote distant-water fishing countries in the region.
Japanese fishing and trading companies operated in the region using
the islands' ports as their bases. In the 1970s, however,
concomitant with the industry recession, market change and the
decrease in deep-sea tuna resources, skipjack tuna drew more
attention. The United States started purse seining and Japan, pole
and lining. Under such circumstances and along with the EEZ
establishment, the Pacific islands showed greater initiative in
pushing forward the industry and, at the same time, seeking returns
from the catch taken in their EEZs by distant-water fishing countries
such as Japan, the United States, Korea, Taiwan a;ld the Philippines
(Kataoka. 1984. pp66-78).
The license fee paid for fishing rights in EEZs has become an
important financial source for some of the islands. The Pacific
island countries, which are engaged or are trying to develop the
industry are -the Solomon Islands, American Samoa, Fiji, Vanuatu,
Kiribati, Papua New Guinea, Tonga, Tuvalu, Western Samoa, and the
u.s. T.T.P.I. Except for American Samoa's tuna canneries, however,
it might not be an exaggeration to say that their industries have
been largely developed by Japanese aid and investment, including
technology said to be the world's most modern.
The content of Japanese fisheries aid to the region ranges from
project aid such as the construction of fish markets, fishery
training centers and research laboratories, to fishing training boats
and the provision of fishing equipment such as freezers, fishing nets
and gear. Technical cooperation includes the dispatch of the experts
from the Japan International cooperation Agency (JICA) and Japanese
Oversea Cooperation Volunteers (JOCV), and accepting trainees from
island nations. The cooperation fields include marine engineering,
fishing techniques, aquaculture and marine research (APIC. 1984.
PP22.24).
Fisheries development in the region by Japan, however, cannot be
discussed without reference to the Japanese private sector. Through
their investments in the form of joint ventures, they have made large
contributions to the development of some of the islands' fishing
industry. Although their primary concern is their own profits
through exploitation of the islands' resources, they are increasing
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island employm~nt opportuniti~s, commodity exports and foreign
exchange earnings. It can be said that, unofficially, both Japanese
aid and private sector intervention have been promoted hand in hand.
What kind of fisheries aid and results. then, were made by
Japanese fisheries development assistance? The following section
features case studies in Fiji, Tonga and Western Samoa based on the
field work conducted by the author in the summer of 1985. Although
not the subject of a field visit, the Solomon Islands are first taken
up since the country is the most major fishing state in the Pacific
islands. Also, the joint ventures in the Solomon Islands and Fiji
are examined for~the aforementioned reasons.
a. Solomon Islands
Together with Micronesia, the Solomon islands carry special
significance in Japanese history in the Pacific, especially to older
generations of both Japanese and islanders. During the pacific War,
some of the islands became fierce battle grounds and it took a huge
death toll on both the Allied and Japanese sides. Whether such a
tragic past affects fisheries cooperative relationships or not is a
different subject, however, Japanese assistance to the Solomons is
marked by the concentration to fisheries sector through both Japanese
official aid and private sector investment. Nearly 80% of total
grants through 1982, 2605 million yen, have been appropriated to
fishery development projects including a fisheries center and several
fishing training boats (See Table I-C).
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Irl the private sector, Taiyo Gyogyo, Japan's biggest fishing
company, has surveyed fish resources in the sea off the Solomon
Islands. The Solomons' seas are said to be exceptionally good
fishing grounds compared with other parts of the Pacific. The joint
venture with the Solomons Government, Solomon Taiyo C., was set up in
1971. The company's shore base and cannery were built in Tulagi and
a second base constructed in Noro in the western province. The
industry rapidly developed and, in 1977, the National Fisheries
Development Ltd. (NFD) was established as a joint venture with
Solomon Taiyo and the Solomons Government to encourage local fishing
industry. Fish products have become the largest export single earner
for the Solomon Islands. Although declining in 1982 due to the world
market recession, it accounted for 41% of total exports in
1983(Doulman. 1985. p12). The fish products include frozen, canned
and smoked tuna, or arabushi. Arabushi is directed to the Japanese
market to serve as the soup stock for the Japanese diet. In 1983,
tuna quota landed totaled 39,000 tonnes. The bulk of it, 34,100
tonnes, was exported in frozen form to Puerto Rico and the United
States. Of the rest, canned products, 3,100 tonnes, were directed to
Britain under the Lome Convention as well as some to the domestic
market, and arabushi, 1,800 tonnes to Japan (ibid.).
The Solomons Government has promoted the localization of the
tuna industry, the capital share of the Solomon Government increasing
from 25% in the beginning to 50% at present. In employment, the
proportion of Solomons crew became 69% in 1981, and that of cannery
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also planned in the near £u~ure. There are, however. problems
surrounding locali~ation and technical transfer. There is still a
big difference between the catch of the vessels largely operated by
islanders and that of the boats manned by more Japanese crew. The
issue is how and to what eXGent localization can be promoted.
The tuna industry of the Solomon Islands can be said to be the
most successful example in the Pacific islands in terms of Japanese
fisheries cooperation. As befits the major fishing country of the
Pacific islands, the Forum Fishery Agency (FFA) is also founded in
the Solomons' capital, Honiara. It is also a successful example of
Japanese fishing cooperation through both the government and private
sectors. For one it has contributed to building in the fisheries
infrastructure, to increasing export and employment opportunities,
and to training of local people. The factors in this success lie in
the rich resources, and in the accordance and enthusiasm of both the
Solomon Government and Japan which have enabled the industry to
develop under cooperation.
b. Fiji
Japan has so far contributed to fisheries development in Fiji in
a quite extensive scale including the construction of a fish market,
fisheries training center and residence in Suva, a fishery wharf in
Lautoka, a fishing training vessel, and equipment such as ice
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plants. Technical cooperation includes aquaculture of prawns. grass
carp and oysters for a source of protein.
Japanese cooperation to the fisheries of Fiji is two-fold as in
the Solomon Islands: through aDA to the Ika Corporation and through a
joint venture, the Pacific Fishing company (PAFCO). The corporation
was established in 1975 in Lami on the outskirts of Suva, fully
financed by the Fiji Government. Japanese fisheries aid has been
extended through this corporation, whose present chief fishery
officer is a British national. Ika owns eight fishing boats lka
Nos.1-8. Ika Nos.1,2,3,4 have been all chartered from a Japanese
fishing company, -Hokokusuisan, which used to operate in the sea off
Papua New Guinea. Ika No.6, a concrete boat, was built in Fiji. Ika
Nos.7 and 8 were built in Japan and purchased by Fiji. The Ika No.5,
a pole and line fishing boat granted by Japan in 1979, is said to be
significant in that it wa~ the first boat newly built for the purpose
of grant aid to the Pacific islands. All the other boats donated
until 1979 had been used boats. However, this boat actually turned
out to be too big (105 tonnes) and too technically complex to be
operated by only Fijian crew, and Japanese experts from JICA have to
be always on board. Although there is much appreciation for Japanese
aid in Fiji, there is also criticism of Japanese tied aid and
preferences for big and expensive projects. For instance, the chief
fisheries officer told the author that they wanted to have a wharf of
$1.2 million, while Japan constructed ODe of $5 million. Or, they
68
wanted two smaller boats instead of just one big boat, and so on
(Hunt, P. Chief fisheries officer. pers comm. Lami. Aug./1985).
The fish caught by ships mainly crewed by local fishermen has
been about a half that of chartered boats more assisted by Japanese
fishermen, although the scale, facilities and number of crew are the
same (Kataoka. 1984. p76). The proportion of Fijian fishermen has
been increasing, but the lack of technical knowledge and skill in
both fishing and engineering is the major problem. The chief
fisheries officer requested more Japanese experts to train local
fishermen.
Tuna industry in Fiji can be divided into two periods: the first
one is the frozen tuna export business by the initiative of the
Fijian Government after independence. C.Ito, a noted Japanese
multinational trading company, operated the export business of frozen
tuna in Levuka, Ovalau, since 1964. The joint venture was requested
by the Fijian Government with the aid of obtaining foreign currency
and employment opportunities. PAFCO was founded in Levuka in 1974.
It was financed by C.Ito with 76% (now 71%) of the shares and the
Fiji Government, 24% (now 25%--the rest is held by a Fijian) (PAFCO
director-general manager. pers comm. Levuka. Aug./1985).
Fiji Can Pty. Ltd. was established in 1977 adjacent to PAFCO,
and financed by a Japanese company, Toyo Seikan, (a subsidiary
company of C. Ito) and the Fijian Government. Can materials are
supplied from Japn. The PAFCO tuna cannery has three lines and a 45-
ton productive capacity per day. A total of 8,500 tonnes of tuna was
p r c> r: e S 5 e din 1 ~J t; 3 (I! C) u 1 mCl n. 1 ~I 8 5. p 10 ), whieh me 3.n s t hat 0 n 1 y abou t
half of the processing capacity of the cannery was used. Most of the
processed cans are exported to Europe and the United States.
Ika has been supplying PAFCO with tuna and PAFCO has been
purchasing the fish from them at a higher than market price. As the
only industry in Levuka, the old capital of Fiji, PAFCO employs about
200-300 Fijian workers, mostly women from Ovalau island. It also
helps in one way to prevent the outflow of the population from
Levuka, which otherwise would have no industry. The company,
however, has been suffering from losses for the last five years and
C.Ito is expected to withdraw from business within two years. As
PAFCO not only provides employment in Levuka and purchases the fish
from Ika, but also supports the 8.3% of the country's exports (in
1983) (Bureau of Statistics, Fiji. 1984), the survival of the company
is of vital consequence of the country. Fortunately, it is said that
a U.S. fishing company will take over from C.Ito.
The reason for the withdrawal of C.Ito is explained to the
author as unprofitableness, but they also commented that "fishing
industry is like gambling." Fisheries are said in Japan to be one of
the most difficult industries to operate. Although C. Ito has dealt
with almost all kinds of businesses, it is not an expert in fishing
and there seems to be reconsideration within the company on dealing
with such risky non-trading ventures. There were also comments from
C. Ito on the high (55%) income tax imposed on Japanese staffers and
on the difficulty in localization. In any case, PAFCO shows the
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difficulties in joint ventures. There is on one hand the risk of
nationalization, the so-called "creeping expropriation," and on the
other hand, the risk of the withdrawal of the financing company such
as C.Ito.
c. Tonga
Tonga is reputed to be a successful case of Japanese official
fisheries aid. This owes much to a Japanese expert from JICA, Susumu
Kawakami, who devoted himself to fisheries development and technical
transfer in Tonga for a total of 15 years. Kawakami was first sent
by the British Government in 1967 before independence. He made a
great effort to train Tongan local fishermen and his name is widely
remembered among Tongan people.
Japanese fisheries aid to the country ranges from the
construction of a fisheries research center to fishing training
vessels and fishing equipment. While there are often cases of
misspending concerning Japanese grant boats, Tonga's case seems to
have gone well. At present, there are three main fishing boats
recently granted from Japan: The "Loha, " a 188-tonlong-line boat for
deep sea tuna fishing, was granted in 1981; the "Takuo," a 23-ton
pole and line skipjack fishing boat which is now used for bottom
fishing was presented in 1978; and the "Albacore," a 13-ton, very
small purse seiner used in Va'vau, given in 1981 (OFCF. 1983. P84).
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The achievement made by the "Loha" is especially noteworthy.
The boat has been actively engaged in deep-sea tuna fishing--
albacore, yellowfin and big-eye in Tonga's EEZ (Japanese grant ships
are principally training vessels and strictly speaking, cannot be
used for commercial purpose.) In 1982, the total catch harvested by
Tongan boats is estimated at about 2,000 tonnes. By the "Loha"
alone, about 311 tonnes of deep sea tuna were caught, of which about
176 tonnes were exported to PAFCO and the rest is consumed
domestically (Pacific Islands Year Book. 1984. p411). Imported
frozen saury from Fiji is used as bait. Unlike skipjack fishing,
deep sea tuna fishing is not very seasonal and the boat operates
throughout the year. Long-line fishing is extremely hard labor and
requires higher technical skill than purse-seining. Also, in
comparison with pole and line fishing, one voyage takes a much longer
period--about one and one-half to two months. The "Loha" is entirely
crewed by Tongan fishermen except for a Japanese expert 50metlmes
aboard. According to the assessment of a Japanese expert, Tongan
fishermen are industrious and can endure hard, long voyages (Japanese
fisheries experts. per comm. Tongatapu. Aug/1985).
Apart from tuna fishing, under a joint project between Japan and
the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), bottom line fishing
boats which are sold to local fishermen are being built by Tongans.
An aquaculture project is not conducted at present due to damage from
a large hurricane in 1982. The total amount of Japanese fisheries
grants to Tonga accounted for 1.05 billion yen (See Table I-E). In
technical cooperation, five fishing experts from JICA and Ib JOey
volunteers have been sent to Tonga and 11 Tongan people were accepted
by Japan for fisheries training.
The success of Japanese fishery aid to Tonga is mainly
attributed to the long devotion of a Japanese individual, the
industriousness and aptitude of Tongans as fishermen and the
eagerness of the Tongan Government. Tongan men used to catch whales
in earlier times and, unlike other islands, do not really mind going
for distant-water fishing over the reefs. Also, the high salaries
paid to the "Loha" crew become an incentive for their willingness to
work. The captain of the "Loha" is said to be paid as much as the
country's minister class.
d. Western Samoa
In Western Samoa, the largest recipient of Japanese grant aid, a
$2 million fisheries center, was constructed in the Apia wharf in
1980. This is reportedly said to be "quid pro quo," playing for
Japan's fishing rights. The huge fisheries complex includes a fish
market, a fisherman's wharf, the office of the fishery division, a
wet laboratory, refrigerators, mechanical workshops, vehicles, etc.
However, it has been reported that the market is underutilized and
was to be rented to a U.S. fishing company. The negotiations between
the Samoan Government and the company, however, did not reach
agreement, and in addition the Japanese Government is reported to
have been quit~ offended.
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Thus, the scheme was aborted. When the
author visited Western Samoa, the spacious fish market was being used
by local fishermen and the government but some laboratory facilities
and refrigerators were not utilized.
Also, the "Tautai Samoa," a boat provided as a grant in kind,
has not been used as a pole and line tuna fishing boat. Not only is
the maintenance on this 23-ton ship poor, the boat is also not
economically efficient to run. As the fish catch is not high, gross
revenue does not meet the cost for bait, gas and maintenance. During
the visit of the author, the ship was used as a fish aggregation
device.
During interviews with a local fishery officer and a JOeV
volunteer (Apia. Aug./1985), lack of understanding and communication
was evident. The local official criticizes the Japanese for not
listening to the local voice. For instance, JOeV built too large of
a catamaran, with attendant high fuel consumption and high running
cost. The Japanese volunteer comments on the thefts of fishing
equipment and irresponsibility of top management, which impede
technical transfer to local fishermen.
The fish market is said to have been designed and built
according to the local request, however, the scale seems to be too
big for their present absorptive capacity. Also, Samoans are not
willing to go out on the open sea over the reefs and the training of
local fishermen does not seem to be proceeding well. The problems of
Western Samoan fisheries development lie in both the Japanese and
Jocal parties.
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Not only is there incompatibility of the Japanese
project with the local capacity and scale, but also there is an
absence of Japanese experts who can settle down for sufficiently long
enough periods devoted to technical training of local fishermen. as
the case in Tonga. Finally, the obvious lack of the enthusiasm on
the Samoan side makes fisheries development all the more difficult.
e. Assessment of Fisheries Aid
A Guide to Japan's Aid states Japan's policy on fisheries aid as
the following:
Japan's policy in this field is to gain a thorough
understanding of the actual conditions of the fisheries in
such countries. Also taking into consideration the
technical level of fisheries of the recipient country,
Japan endeavors to offer cooperation for projects which are
particularly suited to each specific country, thus
contributing directly to the promo+ion of the fisheries in
that country (APIC. A Guide. 1984. P24). (underlining
added).
When one takes a look at this statement, the actual situation of
fisheries aid is found to be rather contradictory. On one hand,
Japanese fisheries aid has been appreciated and has successfully
contributed to fisheries development of island states, as seen in
some case studies. On the other hand, however, there seems to be
cases which have not produced favorable results. Rather, some of
them seem to be misdirected and ill-suited to islands. This is
especially conspicuous in the case of fishing vessels provided as
grant aid.
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For instance. while the author was in Fiji she encountered the
"Te Tautai" anchored off the port of Suva. This pole and line tuna
boat was donated to Tuvalu in 1982. The ship, which was newly
constructed with grant aid, is 179 gross tonnes with a length of 39
meters and 1100-horse power. This $2 million ship is highly
computerized and equipped with modern apparatus including a water-
making machine. In the terms of its scale, technological level,
running cost and its management, the boat is obviously beyond
Tuvalu's capacity. According to a source in the Japanese Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, the decision for the delivery of this ship was made
at the last moment in Japan to consume an unexpected budget
surplus. These excess funds resulted from changed circumstances in
the original project, targeted for some other country. The boat was
fairly forced upon Tuvalu despite the fact that they declined the
offer because they obviously believed that they would be unable to
manage it. This created a catch-22 situation. As the result, the
boat has been placed under the joint-administration with the Ika
Corporation and is nominally used as the research vessel surveying
the resources. Japan is paying the running cost and Japanese experts
are always on board.
Pole and lining boats are found not to be cost effective from
the islanders' viewpoint. Pole and line boats need bait, and the
costs exceeded revenue since their catch is not good enough to meet
running cost. About the case of the "Te Tautai," it was first used
for fishing in the EEZs of Tuvalu and Fiji and actually had a good
harvest in the first year.
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But since there is a lack of the bait,
milk fish, it has become a research vessel. Many islands including
Western Samoa request purse seiners, but Japan does not allow such
grants for the reasons of preservation of the resources and technical
problems.
According to fisheries officials in the islands where the
authors conducted the field work, technical cooperation by Japanese
experts and volunteers is generally appreciated. There was found,
however, a lack of communication in some cases. Although some
experts stay in, or periodically return to the same country a long
span of time, the majority of experts terms are generally short. two
or three years. Technical transfer needs a long time and it is
desirable to provide experts who can stay long enough to work out
technical transfer and promote localization.
There are, however, problems on the recipients too. They
sometimes request whatever items they want and can obtain without
really assessing real needs and suitabilities. In some cases,
recipients lack the enthusiasm and effort required to develop and
learn fisheries. The lack of good management impedes transmitting
technical skills to local fishermen.
Fisheries are a difficult business to run, as has been
mentioned. Price of market is subject to fluctuation and there is a
large unsold stockpile of canned fish on the world market. The
islands' economic scale is small, and each island country alone
cannot compete in the world market. They might, however, be ale to
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compete if they develop fisheries on a regional scale under
cooperation and coordination. Joint ventures are practical means to
develop the industry which requires large capital investment. The
joint ventures provide employment opportunities, give impetus to
island economies and enlarge export income. As businesses, however,
their priority is profit and, as seen in PAFCO's case, there is the
danger of withdrawal from such ventures. Developing industries on
the one hand invigorate island economies. On the other hand, they
creates problems such as environmental deterioration. For instance,
water treatment for canneries is a problem. During the field work,
the author visited American Samoa and looked out at Pago Pago Bay,
said to be the best natural port in the Pacific, while riding a cable
car. The bay was clearly polluted by the waste from the two American
canneries, Star-Kist and Van-Camp. There are some protests against
the contamination, however, it is hushed up since the factories
maintain American Samoa's economy and create large employment. In
Levuka, where PAFCO is situated, the water contamination was not
evident since the cannery is located on the coast and directly washed
by waves, while Pago Pago Bay is shaped like a pot and therefore
water waste pools inside the bay. In Levuka's case, however, people
complain that sharks approach near the coast seeking nutritious waste
from the cannery.
As seen in these fisheries case studies, except for some
countries, Japanese fisheries aid does not really seem to achieve
efficient results in proportion to the amount of money and manpower
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spent and scale encompass8d. It rather betrays Japanese policy which
advocates providing fisheries aid sui-table to islands' conditions_
Its over large proportions, unsuitable content and "quid pro quo in
nature playing for fishing rights also create controversies. Under
such circumstances, there seems to be some reconsideration by the
Japanese government of general aid policy to the region, and there
are requests from islands to broaden sectoral aid. The next part
features case stud~es which seem to suggest the future prospect of
Japanese aid and its policy to the region.
Aid for Manpower Development and Technical Transfer
The late Japanese prime minister Ohira emphasized the importance
of manpower development in his speech made at the fifth general
meeting of the United Nations Conference on Trade And Development
(UNCTAD) in 1979. Looking back at the last 100 years of Japanese
history, he said, Japan has made great efforts to develop human
resources as the prop of nation building. Lacking natural resources,
Japan regards education as most important for manpower development
and modernization. It is now the time, said Ohira, for Japan to
contribute to the development of human resources in its cooperation
with LDCs. Japan should assist overall education and the training of
experts and professionals of LDCs so that they can have the capacity
to absorb technology transfers (Gaimusho. 1981. p90).
As Uhira m'~nLic'IF:-d. ITl3np0,.18r development dnd technology transfer
are indeed indispensable components for building a nation and
developing a country. If technology is thought to be hardware,
manpower is the software to make it functional. The development of
manpower increases the capacity to absorb technology transfer.
Without manpower, technology cannot be transferred nor assimilated
into society. Without technology, manpower cannot effectively
achieve development.
With regards to the Pacific island states, the Japanese aid
policy emphasis on manpower development and technology transfer is
evident, as has been earlier mentioned. The share of technical
cooperation allocated to the region comprises about 30% of the total
Japanese ODA to the region, while the average proportion of technical
cooperation in Japanese aDA in general is about 10%. The Pacific
Basin Cooperation Concept and the contributions to ADB's Technical
Assistance Special Fund (TASF), which is of large benefit to Oceania,
are also evidence. It is further supported by the foundation of the
Okinawa Human Resources Development Center in Okinawa-ken, the
southernmost islands of Japan. At the Center, which was opened on
April 1, 1985, young trainees from Asia and the Pacific Region learn
techniques and skills, especially in agriculture and fisheries. When
Prime Minister Nakasone visited the United States in January, 1985,
the foundation of an Asia and Pacific high-technology center in
Hawaii was discussed under Japan-U.S. collaboration. Also, a
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regiunal tisl1irtft, trainin~ c""nt'3r lS repurt(;dly plCltlned to be built. in
Fiji.
During field work, th0 3uthor encountered two of Japanese grant
aid projects which seem to underline Japanese emphasis on manpower
development. One is the joint laboratory project in Tonga, and the
other is the construction of the Fiji Nursing School. These two
projects are seen significant. The Tongan laboratory project trains
laboratory researchers and the Fiji Nursing School trains nurses,
both with regard to modern medical conditions. The projects increase
the number of the researchers and nurses, which provides the
countries with better medical care and improved public health. The
exchange of medical personnel between Japan and these countries will
also be promoted. In the broader context, both Tonga's laboratory
and Fiji's Nursing School are expected to playa regional role by
receiving and training researchers and nurses from other parts of the
region. If successfully implemented, the schemes could well serve
regional cooperation. For this to happen, however, both island
countries and Japan have to work out a system which encourages such
exchanges.
This section features the two projects as the case studies for
Japanese aid to manpower development and technology transfer in the
region.
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a. Tonga Health Laboratory Project
The joint health laboratory project is ongoing at the Viola
hospital in Tongatapu. This project-type technical cooperation,
which cost a total of T$848,000 and covers the period 1981-1986, was
the first multi-bilateral medical project in the world under the
collaboration of JICA and the World Health Organization. JICA is
responsible for constructing the laboratory building, providing
laboratory equipment, sending Japanese experts, and training local
staff in Japan. WHO also provides experts as well as facilities and
fellowships for the training of local staff. The purpose of the
project is to improve health laboratory services with emphasis on
epidemiological services and the control of communicable diseases.
It is said to boast the best equipped inspection laboratory in the
South pacific including four main laboratories, a conference room and
an office (Tongan Ministry of Health).
Japanese experts told the author (Tongatapu. Aug./1985) that
they hope to make the laboratory a laboratory center in the South
Pacific. Presently, technology transfer to Tonga staffers has been
proceeding smoothly but there seems to be some disharmony between
JICA and the co-partner, WHO, because of a lack of experience in
multi-bilateral joint projects.
b. ¥iji Nursing School
The construction at the Fiji Nursing School, the largest single
Japanese grant aid project ever conducted in the region, was ongoing
when the author visited Fiji. The project is composed of two
phases. The first phase is being implemented from February 1985
until March 1986 at a cost of 1145 million yen, and a second phase is
to be carried out after the first phase over a period of 15 months at
a cost of about 813 million yen. Although 18 months were first
estimated for school completion, the project was too big to be
finished in one phase. The construction will take place over two
years and five months and will cost a total of over $10 million (See
Table IV-18a, 18b).
The health conditions of Fijians is generally good. Epidemics
are infrequent and the average life span is longer than other
developing countries: Fijian men average 60.7 years; Fijian women,
63.9 years; Indian men, 59.6 years; Indian women, 62.4 years (JICA.
The New. 1984. P2-9). There are, however, problems such as poor
sanitary conditions, malnutrition of infants and pregnant women as
well as dengue fever and filariasis. Under such circumstances, Fiji
has been trying to improve the quality of medical and health care and
the equality of distribution of medical services. The country,
however, lacks personnel of proper skill andknowledge. and the
training of such skilled manpower is one of the major concerns of the
Mini~try of Health. The hudi:::r:t oiLhe min1.stry of Health cO[;lpri~;v,j
about 7.9% of the governmerlt budget, and out of this allocation about
2.4% is ,jpent for the Fiji Nursing ~~chool (Ioid. p2<~5).
Nursing education in Fiji began with the Tamavua school
in 1900 and one in Lautoka in 1926. Both of these, however, have
practically no special educational facilities and their buildings are
decrepit. Nursing education is free of charge and the combined
schools have a capacity of 80 students in each class. About 10 of
the 80 fail to graduate and there is a need to improve the contents
of the education to reduce dropouts. The proportions of Fijian and
Indian students are about equal. Male students have been admitted to
the school since 1975 and there are more than 10 male students at
present. In 1983, the Ministry of Health consolidated the two
nursing schools in Suva and Lautoka into one to upgrade the quality
of nursing education. The lack of facilities and equipment, however,
impedede progress. The ministry set up a plan to build a new nursing
school to improve overall nursing education (Ibid. P2-35,36,37).
The project was first proposed to Japanese Diet members who
visited Fiji in March, 1981, and the nursing school project was put
on the agenda for Japanese aid. Then, later in the same year, the
representatives of the Japanese Government, WHO and the Fiji
Government examined the project again and listed it in a priority
agenda. In 1983, a Japanese survey team led by a Japanese woman, the
director of the International Nursing Foundation of Japan, arrived
and conducted the feasibility study. The project was thus set out
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comm. Suva. Aug./1985).
Foreign assistancE::: and aid in the medical field for Fiji have so
far been extend~d from Austrulia, New Zealand, the United States.
Thailand and WHO. Until recently, nursing education was conducted
under the New Zealand curriculum. However, it has been reviewed and
revised to better meet conditions in Fiji. The number of teachers
now total 22 and instructors, 26, including five Peace Corps
Volunteers . After the new school is completed, 120 students (a 50%
increase) will be accepted annually for the three-year basic nursing
course (in total~ 360 students) and 40 students for the 4-6 months
post-basic course (in total, 80 students) (See table IV-18a) (JICA.
The New. 1984. p2-34,2-41).
The school also receives students annually from other Pacific
countries including U.S.T.T.P.I. and the Cook Islands for both basic
nurse and post-basic courses (See Table IV-19). In this sense, the
school plays a regional training role and the expansion and
improvement of the school's education also serves the region. Upon
the completion of construction, five seats will be secured for
foreign students for the basic course and four seats for the post-
basic course on annual base.
The new school site of 2.9 hectares is located on a quiet hill
in Tamavua on the outskirts of Suva. Japan is undertaking consultant
work and construction of school buildings and dormitories as well as
provision of educational equipment and materials. Tender was held
last year and tilE:: Jap<lD'?:::.e firms Azusa :-Jekkei. a planning consul"tant
company, and Taisei Kensetsu, a large Japanese construction firm,
have been conducting the work. The construction has been going
smoothly except for delays by rain and a strike. The Fiji Government
is responsible for land preparation, utility work such as water
supply, furniture, fixtures and other items. Since Fiji's education
has been under the British s~'stem, some medical equipment does not
fit to Japanese variants. According to Azusa Sekkei (pers carom.
Suva. Aug./1985), replacements will be purchased locally. Concerning
equipment coming from Japan, however, JICA dispatches experts to
instruct in equipment operations and maintenance for up to five
years, with the aim of teaching local people to become self-reliant.
IV. CONCLUSION
As has been shown in the first part of this paper, the
geographical focus of Japanese aid is Southeast Asia. As Japan is
heavily dependent for industrial growth on mineral resources from
this area, the economic and political stability of the Southeast Asia
region is of vital concern to Japan. For this reason, Japanese aid
to this region aims to support economic and industrial development in
order to help sustain Southeast Asian governments--whether democratic
or not. Also, Southeast Asia is the artery of the Japanese economy
since the transportation route of Japanese oil from the Middle East
goes through this area. The Straits of Malacca, surrounded by three
countries, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, are of special
importance: about 85% of Japanese crude oil imports and 40% of
Japanese trade cargo pass through the straits (Gaimusho. Keizai.
1981. p81). Therefore, it is vital for Japan to maintain friendly
relationships with these countries and for their governments to
remain pro-Japan. For these reasons, aid to Southeast Asia is
regarded as the cost of Japanese security. Indeed, the aid budget is
categorized under the item of total security cost together with
defense.
On the other hand, the Pacific island states have not been
linked with direct Japanese interests. Concomitant with the
establishment of 200-mile economic sea zones, the nuclear dumping
issue and the rising interest in the "Pacific age," the region began
to have ~iome meallingtu cJ apan
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from the late 19705, Japanese aid to
the region has been slowly increasing, though it still remains less
than one percent of the total Japanese aid. Although the Japanese
Government has not established aid policy for the Pacific islands, it
now seems to have determined regional policy indirectly as part of
the Pacific basin cooperation concept. Whether or not this line of
aid policy for the region will bear fruit depends on international
trends and Japanese efforts, as well as the response from the island
needs.
There is, however, a lot of room to improve Japanese aid to meet
island needs. Except for the bigger islands of Melanesia, economic
development is limited. The islands' smallness, scarcity in natural
resources, high dispersion, small markets, cultural diversity and
traditional value systems make their further overall economic
development difficult. Aid to the region needs to focus on special
concerns taking account of the circumstances of each island. It
should be considered not from donors' viewpoints but from those of
recipients in discerning what is needed.
As told to the author by a Japanese aid officer, since it is not
effective to extend small aid to each island, it might be better to
concentrate on one country as the center. By extending one big
project, a spreading effect to other countries may be promoted, as
with the case of Fiji Nursing School. This, however, has a danger.
From the point of bureaucratic aid allocation, this is an easy and
lazy way to do it. It will, however, create unfairness and increase
;-,u]' 13xamplr-.:, even though the Fiji Nur:-:iinr.T
School receives students from other islands, the number of
acceptances is rattler f~w and limited, only about 5% of the whole
under the new curriculum to be adopted after the completion of the
school (based on data, JICA. The New. 1984. p3-4). In such cases,
the priority of accept~nce is always in the host country as seen in
other cases of regional organizations. Also, the desires, needs and
levels vary from island to island. Aid concentration on one country
as the center, therefore, is dangerous and should be avoided.
What is needed is not bureaucratic mechanical criteria for aid
distribution but more humane consideration which takes into account
the real needs and desires as well as the unique situation and
capacity of each island. As we have seen regarding fisheries aid,
Japanese aid in general lacks such considerations. In this sense,
Japan needs to cultivate Japanese aid officers who have expert
knowledge of the region so as to promote familiarization with needs
and the formulation of appropriate policies. Additionally, the
technology provided under transfer schemes should fits the islands'
cultural and social situation.
To match small aid absorption capacities, program aid seems to
be more appropriate and effective rather than large, wasteful
projects, which are often the case in Japanese aid. During the field
work, the author heard the islanders' wish to have several small
programs rather than one large project. For instance, the Vava'u
High School in Tonga built by Japanese grant aid in 1983 is said to
L),'~ the finest ::wd best-'?Cjuipped school ln terms of facilities dnd
education in Tonga, and is expected to slow the population outflow to
Tongatapu. It is also said, however, that several schools could be
built with the money, 600 million yen, spent for the construction of
this school. Islands can appreciate small programs which are more
cost effective and match their absorptive capacity. Although Japan
does provide small programs, it tends to prefer big projects because
of the reciprocal return to Japanese enterprises. Also, from point
of bureaucratic procedure and an annually based budget which has to
be spent within a given time, it might be easier for aid officers to
deal with one big project rather than several small ones. In the
final analysis, the bureaucrats are not familiar with islands'
situation or their absorption capacity anyway.
In this sense, local Japanese embassies should be given greater
latitude to use discretionary funds. Large project aid would be
better committed by multilateral organizations to lever up and
strengthen the overall regional economy including its transportation
and communication systems. In view of this, Japan should contribute
more to multilateral organizations and should also extend aid to the
regional organizations (such as SPEC) of which Japan is not a member
and therefore does not currently appropriate aid.
Also, Japan should not only increase aDA but should also
encourage other means of economic cooperation such as trade, private
investment and voluntary aid. Especially in trade, Japan should
provide more access to the Japanese market by taking special trade
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preference measures. Japan greatly owes its economic growth to
developing countries. As has been previously explained, Japanese
aid, which started from the postwar reparations, became a major force
to rehabilitate and boost Japanese industries. It geared up Japanese
overseas exports, thus helping its own economic growth. When one
thinks of such historical facts, what Japan should do now is not only
open its market but also conclude special agreements with Pacific
island states to promote island exports by thus returning the debt
Japan owed to developing countries in the past. An editorial in the
Mainichi Shimbun (Dec.23/1985) comments on Japanese economic
cooperation to developing countries. It suggests that if Japan is
really aiming to promote export industries of developing countries,
Japan should be ready to take active measures such as reorganizing
its own domestic industrial policies in the broader context of the
international division of labor
Most important, however, is manpower development. Donors are
apt to force projects upon recipients based on donors' own concepts
of development and their own wants and needs rather than those of
islands. They tend to neglect the traditional value system of
recipients, which is an important key to development. The best way
to develop a country, needless to say, is by its own manpower at its
own will. In this sense, technical cooperation and assistance to
manpower development can best serve this purpose and can be the core
of Japanese aid to the region.
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Apart from humanitarian concern, the purpose of aid is in
helping a country achieve true independence. In reality, however,
aid seems to make these islands more and more dependent. A Chinese
proverb says, "Give not a fish but a fishing rod and teach how to
catch fish." This is what donors are supposed to do--not just giving
money, or telling recipients what to do but teaching how to do it.
Each country should have its own model of development based on its
own cultural concept and social and natural environments. A nation
can learn a great deal from the development of others as a model,
however, mere copying does not lead to development in a true sense.
Rather, it creates tensions and counteraction. In this sense, Japan,
which shares a certain kind of traditional value with the region, is
in a position to understand their problems better than other Western
donors and to assist in coordinating their solution. Manpower
development is also important to cultivate island leaders who can
discern what they need to develop and how to develop based on their
own concept and not on donors' concepts. The development of human
resources leads a people to develop with their own hands at their own
will. It leads a country to lessen its external dependency and
eventually to real independence.
G. Kent asserts that true development should aim not only at
"achieving economic growth" or "the alleviation of poverty" but also
at achieving "human growth," that is to say, "the alleviation of
powerlessness" of the people who can not control of their own life
(Kent. 1983. ppS-20). In this sense, development should be
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understood not only in the terms of economic development but also in
the total development of society and people. For development
unaccompanied by a human dimension will not bestow happiness on a
people in the real terms of human life.
Manpower development and technical transfer, however, take a
long time. It is said in Japan that it took 100 years for Japan to
develop human resources, beginning during the Meiji restoration when
Japan came out from the feudalistic age and pushed forward
modernization of the country. Then how can islands solve the urgent
economic issues they are facing now? A Japanese who has been engaged
in island business for a long time has one view. He thinks that
Japanese aid is best directed towards employment generation and the
creation of local economic opportunities. He says Japan should
extend aid which can give incentives to island economies and increase
internal economic capability, as opposed to aid related to welfare
which can be promoted by Australia and New Zealand. Certainly such
type of aid is needed, however, it can be interpreted that it is the
kind of aid that meets Japanese commercial interests, which is often
the subject of international criticism. In any case, however, as
long as Japan wishes to maintain its economic power and if aid, after
all, serves the donor's national interest, there is no need to worry
about such type of aid disappearing.
Nor will there be any doubt that fisheries aid will continue to
be the major Japanese aid to the region, as fisheries are a major
resource and potential industry islands wish to develop. Japanese
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aid, however, will probably broaden its sectors, trying to improve on
the overemphasis on fisheries in future. Also, having passed its
groping age of trials and errors, Japanese aid seems to have entered
a new stage, where the principles of aid policy have finally found a
mode of creation. That is to say, being determined within the
framework of the Pacific cooperation concept, Japanese aid policy to
the region will underline the importance of manpower development and
technical cooperation. This seems to coincide with the transition of
Japanese aid in general from the stage of mere transfer of "money"
and "materials" to the new stage of transfer of "technology" and
"man.
As Keizai Kyoryoku no Rinen implies, Japanese aid policy is
based on national self-interest. Judging from the report, the
principles of Japanese aid are more strategic than philosophical.
There are, of course, no donors unconcerned with their own interests
and it is a natural point of consideration in aid policy.
Additionally, according to international political and economic
trends and a country's domestic situation, aid policy naturally
changes. The principles of Japanese aid policy, however, seem too
self-centered and short-sighted. Since Japanese aid principles are
so directly connected with the regions of its own immediate
interests, Japan is very susceptible to external influence. It lacks
insight based on a global view. It lacks the awareness of
interdependency as a member of international society. In other
words, Japan's philosophy underlying its aid policies is not
apparent. The same observation, however, can be applied to Japanese
diplomacy. If aid is a key to the North-South problem and Japan is
eager to contribute to its solution as an advanced nation, Japan
needs to establish an aid philosophy based on a global view and not
just on its own, narrow interests. For without a global view, an
awareness of interdependency and humanitarian concern, the North-
South problem will never find a way to solution.
APPENDICES
1) Grant aid is classified into general grant aid (56.5% of total
grant aid in 1883), grant aid for fisheries (5.1%), grant aid for
disaster relief (2.1%), grant aid for cultural activities (1.0%),
food aid (13.8%), and aid for increased food production (21.3%).
2) Japan does not extend aid for government budget support and the
only cash flow is grant aid for cultural activities.
3) Japanese aDA to China has sharply increased after 1980.
4) Eighty billion yen has been appropriated to Africa in the 1985
budget.
5) Although Japan extended a total of $40,000 to Nauru in 1981-1982,
this was to conduct experiments on wave-powered generation and it
cannot really be considered as aid.
6) Export and import figures of some countries (Tables 16,17) are
not from 1980. Also, some countries such as U.S.T.T.P.I. are
missing in the tables.
7) Japan, as a major fish consuming country, has been actively
engaged in fishing in the region. Japan's main fishing
activities are, however, in the northern waters. The Japanese
market demands fresh fish, and not tins of fish. Demanded are
high-price kinds of fish such as salmon, trout, crabs, lobsters
and shrimps, most of which are caught in the northern sea.
Contrary to common assumption, tuna is really not an important
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To,,1 ("nd ')ILI. net (23.8) 15.3 8.1 86 122 354 ]39
J. O:t,",JI fund~ In '.Iuppor! of prj1o'ate C'lI'port ucdits (included in II.A.1. _ 1.]9 _ _
4 ~)~~~~,', fund' ""~~~~;l~;-r'ri~~"e ;~~e';;';~~1 i,~~i~.i~d'i~ i.·A.i: ~j,~';.') = =-- I m:~ I ~~;:~ I
~. Inll'f(""l r«cl\-C'd on \lOA . .......••.. 25.9 50.~ 129.8 122.4
6 1:1',>;;rC"»1 ft .. ::I'·('u on OOF _.................. . .• _. _ _
'1 -\{~~t~:'..(r.jI1\~ e'r<ns.cll " _ 6.1 ..J-----_....._----_._----------------------_._----
1'" lJ I" 1 1-.2. !:~; ~.' ~ f.J (:~. :'iil:'nci:~1 :('~:()~: rc (;\'C'lOi)ill~, Cc;:nt.,ic:' ;:,t ;. I t i J:. ~ (' ,! '; ,( 1, 1l)rn (',f1j i I I i
COMPARISON OF FLOWS BY TYPE
The Flow or Financial Resources to DcvclopinB Countries and Multilateral Agencies. 1983
Total
[)"C





I ~. 1 h;- :.",.,..,
O,:,a ()!"".: fin., ,DOh n,' ,4 + H! 5030 115 -5 til 2,5 IX}
-\ n',llC~J! l):';-,cr 0;11,: ..IJ I j~,.",\ (I .. :) 4925 'l6 -" 32 2S5 114-
1 0;1;(,.11 r\j,,'n t:rC~I1~·. 2 100 9(, -S - 22(, 173
~ l ";'UII'.':, .. l'.tJ (ll~o;r '="'IJte~JI Jhcl, 2 t!l26 U 82 2'J 1
U '1l.;1l;i.l:':·Jllr:\III"~I";'S lOS 19 - - 9




























































































































































































































































































































or,-,( i.6! [Mo.tlopmf'~1 A\.\isf;;r,nrr (ODAIr., (A .. 8) ...•......... 27 451
Of'.l CL~ -t. oJ" G.\P.. ..... J . . • • . . . . . • • • . . . 0.J6
\ B '.. ::r~! O~:Ci31 DtvclcF~ent Assis!ar -e (l + 2) 18518
L G~a~:5 a~d rra:''Il lIke ccntrlbullor.S " 14 126
11. Te:~,"ICall1~i~tance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 I·U
I: F">d ad .. , . . . . . . 931
I J ~cc! r~:'{;\:nr\S ., . . . . . 144
I 4 Adr."';n;strJII\C costs • • • . • . • • . • 9~
I \ O,r." s"r,,, .. " . . . . . ., .... 6 299
~t'·.ej,.);..:t',enl Icn.linf!: :l:"ld cJpital . . . . . . .40)
2: ~= ..... <!:H!~r'T::r.(lendlng . . . . ) 529
:: ~ f~>od a:d !o3ns . . . 706
:: 3 C','bt !'NfZ.r.:SJtlf'l't . • • • • • • as
~ 4 E";'~ltlts ll'1d ct!1('r bilateral as~cts ... . . . . IJ - - 1
B C..;;.:rl~ .. ::.1r,5:", mU;I:iJtC'fJII .. stll:Jtio~, (: + 2 + 3) 8910 219 31 191
I C"r.:S . .. 3961 105 18 131
ill:' ..\"",<0 2227 88 18 J8
; 1 t EC • I 361 - 79
i J O:r." .. . . . . 373 17 0 15
".hi;; hod ,Id F'"".!elJl ,. 761 JS 6 26< ~·,;'~~!';rtl'.)tI p)~:n:s :.,d limi!;u to.. 4965 115 18 60
lii:-: IJ (inol IFe) . . 229 - - 1&
:1 leM ll46 61 - 17
U R',:on,1 D"c!cp,..nt B,d. I 485 5J 18 S
2 1 0,,, 105 - - -
(,x';:::'l)ic;,ll !t: . .,d>~ . . . . . .. -5 -I 0






















































I '66:... ,I ~ If, lural ":'.. ,al flo., ]] 488 869 153 56} I M5 j78 155 4 :8] J 7N
Lr:il.r.~~ t;~ Pra~att \ uh.nt.,) '\~f'n('l~ • • • 2344 31 12 30 132 IJ 16 J6 370
\. I'" .. " I '0_' a, \\"h' Itr",.tl '0 4! 34 3011 ~I -35 3~5 5U 4~S -44 j 016 } ~j7
I Ur'o,' ,-.",C""' . 6 2117 HI )0 62 395 JI 17 399 H4J
U L~:UJ: ;"<,nf,,iin ln~o!rlCn' Jnd C'lhcr t7 459 511 ~1 212 - I -Ib4 1614
\L:l L"n.:.1 '1"",-,-\(,".10 Ino!I':,cnt 5359 ·6 -·1 _.~ 201 41)
i';I'J~C t"\;"<'!l ~'COJI~~ • . ~ IV() -14H --(.S 251 -H .. 59 -61 2953 -JJ
H (j,1,) .\I"r""Jr;. ~"'·I·.'lU1' .ndtJJrJ in IV' . . . . . 10039 JJ :01 - - I 660
I; Rt~ldent bJr.... :.': lh.H:SC in bd;atcral claims . . . 11 lOS - - J) ~Ol - - -200 I 5t1b
·in rc~:~" cu,rcr.~y . . . . . . . . . . • . . . - - -]1 - - - - "32
.:~ ~\':'~n:H,': c .. rr('nc)' .... . . . . . . . . . . • .. - - 44 - - - - I 228
\h:":Jl"': JX'do"c inv,,'menl 29J4 - - - - - - 201 13 - I 497 96
'. j 0111 R,· .o"r« 110" ,U,:aner of Po! m,n'. &',,1\1 '0 IVI ~9 131 952 DU 957 2399 I 076 117 9334 7 OU7 110M 8 66.1 1 17M 113 7~a \ )0M 3 1<) ~ ; I'
Tuc'l{. ·,.,.,n. .. ,",'l.,,((,,\P 0.9/ OO} 019 1./7 0.76 1.9S 0.}7 1.81 1.07 063 Olj 1.66 0'<1 U4 14, J.': I."
n .\,.' j'~'C'nl r.. ·;I..J urW lhn' ~;jd'JtrJ~ . .
A.!; ..J:rJ Rnc__ 'rr' ficrw. CU!l.wJJJ~/fJ Ba!afI(Y Shr~1 8QJiJ
I TO I;'· n' 15;.; + n' /5 to I
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Table J:J-3:
I ()!
DAC MEMBERS' ODA TERMS PERFORMANCE IN 1982 AND 1983
-
TOla' Grants .. $ a ODA. loan term\ Grant clcm("nt
ODA .hln: or ODA or 10lal ODA
Country commit menu. 'ClmmitmcnlJ J~ tere1t fa:c Maturiry Grace period CranE element Q)1-nmi1mcnu
S milliim (',t) ('H (yea,,) (ye,n) n) ('1)
1982 198) 1982 Inl I,S= 190 1982 198) In2 1983 19S2 1983 1982 1983
\ustralia · ............ 843 749 100.0 100.0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 100.0 100.0
\ustria · ............. 423 231 36.1 42.2 5.1 5.0 14.8 12.1 1l.3 6.3 35.5 32.7 58.8 61.1
lelgium · ............. 561 554 92.6 87.3 0.8 (0.4) 30.0 (30.0) 10.0 (10.0) 81.5 (82.2) 93.6 (97.7)
:anada · ............. 1414 1740 88.7 92.4 0.1 0.0 49.3 49.9 5.9 10.0 89.2 90.2 98.8 99.3
)enmark · ............ 481 427 74.1 81.6 0.0 0.0 35.4 30.8 8.8 8.3 88.3 80.7 95.7 96.4
'inland · ............. 190 167 85.8 99.6 0.7 4.0 26.9 10.0 7.2 2.0 71.3 25.7 95.9 99.7-
ranee · ............. 5142 5102 81.1 78.8 (3.7) 3.5 (22.2) 22.2 (7.3) 7.9 (45.8) 47.2 89.7 83.8
iermany · ............ 3701 3234 67.3 71.3 p.2) (2.2) (39.4) (35.0) (8.1 ) (6.7) 65.3 (61.4) 88.5 (88.9)
ary ..........•..... 1709 1601 86.0 82.3 2.2 .. 14.2 .. 3.0 , . 39.0 40.7 91.4 89.5
Jpan ............... 4398 5386 39.6 55.2 2.9 3.3 27.9 27.6 9.2 8.8 57.0 54.3 74.0 79.5
!elherlands ........... 1 366 1 256 84.2 87.7 2.3 2.5 29.6 29.0 7.9 7.9 61.4 60.7 93.9 95.2
'cw Zealand ........... 52 51 100.0 100.0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 100.0 100.0
orway • •••••••• a •••• 538 528 98.9 98.2 4.2 3.8 9.5 11.6 3.0 3.5 25.0 25.4 99.2 98.6
....eden · ........... . . 981 734 99.5 99.6 2.0 2.0 25.0 25.0 10.0 10.0 63.1 63.1 99.8 99.8
.... ilzerland ............ 275 398 89.8 94.2 1.3 0.3 25.5 22.6 9.5 10.1 67.1 74.3 96.6 )8.5
niled Kingdom '....•.... 2 008 I 627 96,7 97.0 2.3 3.7 22.8 23.4 5.7 5.6 .55.5 44.5 98.5 93.4
niled Sla les . . . ........ 8232 9482 82.2 85.5 ~.7 3.0 33.9 32.7 9.9 9.4 64.4 61.7 93.7 94.4
Total DAC countries ..... 32315 33 267 76.1 79.7 2.8 (29 ) 29.8 (28.4) 8.5 (8.2) 58.3 56.6 90.3 91.2
rndudl"' debl reoraanilalion: fer terml c .. dudina debt rcoTs:)nis,uion ~e Table \/'-4 In t~ ~.Jn tut
lOR
T3ble 11-4: TYING STATUS OF TOTAL OOA·, 1983
Gross disburJemt'nlS Pt'TcentafJe:r
I Mullil.I.,.! ODA TOlal I~I'" identified
Bil.,eral OOA (..c1udi.. EEC)---
Counlry Excludin. EEC Unlied Partially Tied
I I
EEe' - (I) lied" - (3)
Unlied Partially tied T,ed Untied' Tied +(4) -(2) + (5)
(I) I (2) I (l) (4) m (6) (7) (8) (9)
Australia ... 44.3 - 26.2 26.1 3.4 - 70.4. - 29.6
All.lria 3.3 - 75.5 19.7 1.6 -23.0 - - 77.0
Belgium 15.6 - 44.0 22.4 1.4 16.6 38.0 - 45.4
Canada 9.7 - 47.9 35.9 6.5 - 45.6 - 54.4
Denmark 36.3 - 22.9 30.9 2.3 7.5 67.3 - 25.2
Finland 45.7 - 13.7 36.0 4.6 - 81.7 - 18.3
-ranee 30.S - 7.6 46.9 8.0 - 7.0 38.S 7.6 46.9:iermany 48.2 - 20.4 20.1 - 11.3 68.3 - 20.4
taly · . .. .. . , .. .. .. .. .. "
apan · . 37.6 15.9 14.1 32.3 - - 69.9 15.9 14.1
o/clherlands 40.9 16.3 11.0 23.1 0.3 8.3 64.0 16.3 11.3
~e\V Zealand 41.3 - 36.0 22.0 0.7 - 63.3 - 36.7
;orway 377 - 19.0 43.3 - - 81.0 - 19.0
weden · . 57.2 - 11.5 27.5 3.8 - 84.7 - IS. 3
wilzerland 45.2 - 22.5 30.9 1.4 - 76.1 - 23.9
nited Kingdom 14.2 0.3 40.9 27.8 0.1 16.7 42.0 0.3 41.0
niled Slates 26.9 12.0 30.6 29.1 1.4 - 56.0 120 32.0
Total DAC . . . . ., " .. .. . . . . ..--,--_.
f- ,dudln, ;1t'mlrlISltJll'lle Ct)SU
hdudcll I:onlrlbuiionl ro rc,ioniJ.1 org.1ni)itil'ln\ which undenih procurement in their Member 3ftd conlribulO' rUlionl• ...,ilb no sub-!,t..Jnti.ll rt"llrictivn 'U rc.prd) a cuuntry'~elj~lbllily ror mcmbc:n.hiporcontributor
')l.ltlJ.>
t-f.C rr()(:urem~nl In.Jy be urtJertaJ..cn in EEC Member countri~l. Ind in any or lhe 64 35.SlXi~tC'd ACP sUln.
Rcf(f~ 10 bll..I!cr;i1 ,a;d onl)'
(O,\C, 1984 p219)
11 1'1
'ld) 1(' 1L-'J: SECTOR AllOCATION OF R1LATERAL 00:\ COM\IID-IE:-;rS, 19S2 Al"D 19S3
Million US dol/un































14.0 168.0 85.1 69.7 24.4 62.6 17.6 20.4 51.6 /33.5





























































I 922.3 1 026.0
2953.8 2 576.9
3086.9 2 503.8
3 854.2 I 338.5







































































































































































































































1982 467.8 5 145.4 2572.2 I 369.7 6612 2542.6 1 300.9 68·U; 501i.S 1 431.4 16685.9
1983
16.8268.1 169.3 408.8212.4
29.7 324.2 253.9 514.4 ~07.3
43.7 33B 853.0






















6.9 548.5 2 863.3
































































Table II-6: TECH~ICALCO-OPERATION EXPENDITURE
Official bilateral d;sbursements by individual donors
S million
COU""y 1970 197. 1979 19EO 1981 1982 1983
Australia · ........... 12.9 48.2 41.9 53.6 67.4 91.7 99.0
Austria · ............ 2.7 31.1 37.1 31.3 41.0 33.4 38.2
Belgium · ........... 51.3 190.1 214.6 225.9 186.0 159.2 144.6
Ca:l:tda · ............ 41.2 54.7 49.7 99.2 121.9 138.5 117.7
Denmark · ........... 11.7 68.5 76.9 105.2 93.3 97.1 ! 15.7
Finb!ld · ............ 13.4 29.7 32.6 36.4 43.6 42.1
France · ............. 438.2 1 389.5 1676.8 1 825.1 1 510.1 1494.7 . 1607.7
Germany · ........... 190.1 682.7 836.6 990.7 878.5 870.2 833.6
Italy .............. 14.6 40.9 49.3 55.4 70.4 111.9 162.8
Japan .............. 21.6 221.2 241.9 277.8 338.0 353.0 385.1
Netherlands .......... 38.5 234.6 289.1 327.6 321.3 332.2 294.4
New Zealand . • . . "'; . . . . . 16.0 18.1 26.5 17.7 12.7 10.9
Norway ............. 4.3 34.5 37.9 42.3 39.4 48.7 39.6
Sweden · ............ 20.6 87.2 89.6 108.8 105.0 117.6 143.0
Switzerland .......... 2.1 6.1 8.0 34.2 34.5 41.6 30.9
United Kingdom ........ 109.3 294.0 394.0 506.8 431.9 365.4 345.4
United Slates ......... 578.0 367.0 598.0 734.0 965.0 1094.0 1445.9
Tota! DAC countries .... I 537.0 3 779.7 4689.2 5477.0 5 257.8 5 405.5 5 856.6
, I I
TlbJc II-7 : EXPERTS A~D VOLUNTEERS
'Publidy fin~nted technical co-operation per~oJnn.:l by individu;ll dC,n0T>
Num/>t'r ,j pff)'Jll!
Counlt)' 1910 1978 1979 1980 1931 I q~ ~ l~~l
Australia · .... , ..... 1024 I 204 I 270 1 356 I 351 1 574 I 755
Austria · ........... 288 571 545 555 562 430 45~
Belgium · ........... 3 199 2 836 3036 3022 3 138 3051
Canada · ........... 3080 986 2978 2057 1 345 3242 3454
Denmarl:: · .......... 774 I 037 1 035 1045 1023 1051 1 159
finland · ........... 98 176 74 117 183 176 176
France · ........... 38 122 27068 (23 136) .,
Germany · .......... 6344 6470 6697 5850 5903 5865 5629
Italy ............... 1 507 I 512 1693 I 597 I 714 2190
Japan · ............ 2629 6610 6673 8215 9878 I 1011 I I 094
Ncther1:lnds · ........ 1 177 3319 3572 2963 2689 3 192 2942
New Zealand • • '0' ••••• 869 583 60S 449 421 439
Norway · ........... 50S 512 509 433 464 521 459
Sweden · ........... 658 568 520 510 526 549
Switzerland .......... 129 985 976 1060 1 035 1012 1 028
United Kingdom ....... 17354 9519 8 765 7614 6512 5973 5765
United States · ........ 22417 11447 13 498 14408 17 186
TGlble Il-8: STUDENTS AND TRAINEES
Publicly financed fellowships by individual donors
Number ofpersons
Country 19,0 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
Australia · ........... 2769 3642 3 112 3393 4185 4270 4382
Austria · ........... 367 4294 400S S 3S1 6106 S 346 6496
Iklgium · ........... 3258 2932 3199 3258 2680 2630
Canada · ........... 2757 1 927 I 762 1 723 I 707 1662 I 705
Denmark · ........... 383 45S 507 556 461 526 481
Finland · ' ........... 66 295 148 394 406 413 429
france · ............ 14191 17 S20 18 718
Germany · ........... 19646 31 237 33260 38414 36234 21904 15431
Italy · ............. 1 512 1 876 I 983 2077 2624 2954
Japan · ............. 361.5 7726 9 197 9342 10030 I 1096 12394
l"cthcrlanJs ........ 1 209 1 152 1 296 J 256 1 320 1237 I .~%
New Zealund ....... I 264 979 992 770 1 058
N(\r .... ay · ... 276 844 I 100 I 260 1422 I 294 I 761
SVI,Cl:en · ............ I 315 7 ....
SWlllcriand · ......... 743 975 847 832 835 I 123 1 123
L'nitcd Kiag,loM 12056 IS 433 17 434 IS 507 14357 12352 12 195
L,,,tcd St2(CS ... , ..... 18 272 6734 7967 6854 8772 8 328 9294
Table II-9: ODA TO LLDC's ;\~D OTHER LOW I:--:CO\1E COl):"TRIES I:" 1982 A:--:D 19~J"
aDA lu LLUC. OD,\ to {,tn;;r l.IC·~ t
C<Jun:ry
(~. or
'.t urG:-;p " uf 'X of G:-;P
10,.1 aDA 101 .. ] ODA
19.2 198) 1982 19~J 19.2 1983 I ~s 1 l'lOJ
Australia · . · ..... · . 17.5 14.8 0.10 0.07 29.0 29.4 0.16 0.14
Austria · . · .... · . 6.6 12.5 0.04 0.03 12.0 22.6 0.06 0.05
Belgium · . · .... · . 25.3 24.7 0.15 0.14 42.6 42.2 0.25 0.24
Canada · . · .... · ... 27.5 28.2 0.12 0.14 38.S 33.1 0.16 0.16
Denmark · .......... · ... 37.3 38.9 0.29 0.28 40.3 37.2 0.31 0.27
Finland · . · .... · .. 27.6 33.5 0.08 0.11 45.0 42.8 0.14 0.14
France . . . . · .... · .. 16.0 15.9 0.12 0.11 17.5 16.4 0.13 0.12
Germany . . . · .... · .. 25.0 25.8 0.12 0.12 33.2 39.9 0.16 0.19
Italy . . . . . · ...... · . 30.7 .. 0.07 . . 28.0 ..
I
0.07 . .
Jap:1n ........... · .. 18.5 18.3 0.05 0.06 46.9 52.1 0.13 . 0.18
Netherlands · ...... · .. 26.9 27.4 0.29 0.24 37.5 37.4 0.40 0.33
Ncw Zealand · ...... · ... 10.5 6.6 0.03 0.02 25.5 17.5 0.07 0.06
Norway · . ....... · . · . 35.S 33.4 0.35 0.35 38.1 36.1 0.38 0.37
Swedcn ....... .. . .. . . . 30.2 29.5 0.31 0.23 46.5 43.0 0.47 0.34
Switzcrland · ............. · . 30.6 J2.S 0.08 0.10 29.5 30.2 0.07 0.\0
United Kingdom .... · . 29.1 27.7 0.1 ! 0.09 37.9 43.4 0.14 0.14
United SI:llCS · . ..... 17.0 16.8 0.05 0.04 37.7 37.2 0.10 0.10
Tetal DAC countrics 21.4 20.5 0.08 0.07 34.8 35.5 0.13 0.13
(1) Disbummcnti, Preliminary dJII. AllDC'lted amOu"t:s only. 1r.c1udIMllmputcd multt!:lttral nO.I. Values usrC in this IJblc ;,arc b.:a;;cd \In loe 'co&1 JphK;,d
di~ol"butiun of multilatertll orian:1.1lions· C'On"'eutoftal no.." in 1912.
61 Inciodin, Indio .n4 ChIn•.
(D:\C, 1984 p227)
Table :tn-IO: FOREIGN AID RECEIPTS AS A PROPORTION OF
















































Note: For Solomon Islands ~nd Vanuatu the expenditure figures apply to 1980.
(f,lidli1irn, T.1..r., 19(3') p(>S)






























































The main source for this table is
~~~ 0~~~ (1981): 1981 Review of
Development Cooperation, Paris. Figures
for American Samoa, Guam and TTPI were
supplied by the USA Embassy in Fiji, and
the total for Regional
Institutions/Projects was obtained from





I 1978 I 197Y I
I I I
I I I
I Total I Total I Total Bilateral ($)
-----------------------1----------1-----------1-----------------------------
I I I
American Samoa I 27 913 I 30 536 I
Cook Islands I 5 900 I 6 700 I
Fiji I 22 500 I 27 900 I
French Polynesia I 78 800 I 128 SOD I
Guam 1 85 739 I 76 071 I
Kiribati I 9 300 I 8 000 I
Nauru • I 0 I a I
New Caledonia I 100 100 I 132 700 I
Niue I 3 700 I 4 400 I
Notes: Papua New Guinea I 260 000 I 253 400 I
-1-.---The 1979 figures for American Samoa Solomon Islands I 23 200 I 23 200 I
and Guam which were not availnbll! Tokelau I 800 I 1 600 I
when the last edition was published Tonga I 8 400 I 21 000 I
are now included. TTPI I 115 304 I 99 700 I
Official development assistance Tuvalu I 2 200 I 4 000 I
(ODA) as defined by the OECD Vanuatu I 16 300 I 34 000 I
includes all flews to developing Wallis and Futuna 1 2 200 I 6 900 I
countries by official institutions. Western Samoa I 17 300 I 27 000 I
provided their aim is econOlllic Regional Institu- I I I
develop~ent and social welfare and tions/Prqjects I 8 275 I 12 373 I 22 651 0
t~cy have a concessionary grant 1 1 1 _
element of at least 25 per cent. South Pacific Region I 788 431 I 897 980 11 066 189 991 438 2:
These ore net flows. -----------------------1------ 1 1 _
It should be noted that in many cases the amounts of ODA given here would be understnted. Collection
of aid d.1ta is extremely difficult even for the donors, .!lnd there are often considerable time 1.:Ig5
involved between the announcement of aid and its disbursement. For the American territories, for
instance, only aid or transfers from the USA is given here. They did, however, receive some aid [raJ
other bilateral as well as multilateral sources. though such amounts are comparatively small. The
totals in thi~ ta~le are different from those in Table 13 mainly because of the different sources
from which the data were obtained. The data in Table 13 are somewhat more comprehensive and ~ore
complete. Tile relative magnitudes for the various countries are, however, somewhnt similar.
SO~C donor countries also channel significant amounts, not recorded here, through unofficial
voluntary agencies.
1,' :; -1..' :~ATIf)NAL r~COME Arm GJV"RN:l~NT <:XPF.NDITURE
-------------------------------------------------------------------------_.~--------------------------------------------------------------------------
GRO"S DOMESTIC PRODUGT/GROSS NATIONAL INCOME(a) TOTAL GOVER~lE~IT EXPENDITURE (RECURRENT A~u CAPITAL)
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Govt: The Accounts and
Financial Report
for the year 1981
Govt: Institut d'~mi5sion d'Cutre
Her. Rapport d'activite 1932
Govt. (Commerce)
ADB(g)
Covt: Institut d'~oi5si~n d'Outr~
Her. Rapport d'activit~ 1982
Govt: Abstract of Statistics 1981




NZ Govt:Tokelau Report of t~e ~ini­
~ of foreign Affairs for tre
~~~ded 31 March 1982.
Govt. (Statistic~)
Covt: Quarterly Bull. oC Statisti~9
Govt: Second Dev. Plan 1980-83
Covt: (Planning)
Govt:Institut d'emission d'Outr~
Mer. Rapport d'activite 1982
AOB(g)
Hotes:
It~ not possible to obtain for all countries GOP figures, hence the use of GNP figures in some coseS; nor WDS it possible
to obtain for all countries as to whether their GOP/GNP was valued at market prices or factor costs. The figures repreJent
t~c ~ost up-to-date available, and those supplied by the national authorities are preferred to those published by others
clcept when country-supplied figures are neither available nor current.
C~cer the two col~n9 for Source, Govt. indicates that the information was supplied by the GovernMent, with the originating
~eparl~ent in brackets. Where the source is a published document, the publisher is named followed by the full title of the
Gocur?nl; ..here, however, the publicat ion al'pe.:lrs more than once, only the publisher is indicated in the text of tile table,
with the full title of the publiclltion appearing in the relevant footnt'te.
GJP; (d) CDP ot market prices, (e) COP at factor costs; (£) GNP.
A~ian t:evelopment Bank (ADB) (1983). Key indiclltors of devl'loping member countrieo 2!~, vol. XLV, Manila.
Nauru does not publish national income figure9.
(icC,; (1932). 1982 Revi.o-: of development eoopcrilt io,:, Pari ::.
:""J ,>q l~,~t~ supplied by the Planning Office.
I Cur~ent eX!lPnditure only.
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Table 111-14: Japanese aDA to Pacific Countries ($mjllion)




Fiji C.2G o ~. C.552 3.2:] 2.CS ~ ~ 1 !. . " ,) ....
Nauru - - - - C.03 0.0 l
Papua New Guined -2. t5 -C.~O L48· 1.80 2.33 ~ ~t!\..I.Ov
Tonga 0.58 1 c.' 1.14 0.48 3.40 C.75
I
.wJ
j Western Samoa O.St 1 "'') 2.83 2.01 3.8'; 3.43~ .. ,,"OJ
Kiribati - (J. ~ 1 I 0.21 C.52 l.S5 0.£2 loS;; I
Solomo.~ Islands -O.lJ C.S1 3.53 O.s:> 2.iG 3.1S I
Tuvalu - - - - 0.8! (j.S3
V,Jnuatu O.Ci C.OS - C.Ol 0.12 0.37
Trust Territory C.u7 C.5{ C.C~ 0.33 2.~5 L23
of the Pacific
Islands
C.OS ~.S{ ! 13.£0
..
Total
", C,,", 13. d.2 22.63i 1. w.)
~
Table I] J _: :.i :50urce of Finane ial Flows to the S?D~Cn



























































Source: DECO, Co~puter Printouts, March 1983.
(ADG, 1983 p3J)
!3lJl~ III-H): DESTIN,,,110,"-: OF EXPORTS 19130' ($000)
Destination South EUROPE
Exporting New Pacific United United Other
Country Australi. Zeal.nd Region Kingdom France Others States Japan Countries Total
American Samoa 56U
~
3 109,947 807 681 112,006
Cook Islands 2,076 4 2,080
Fiji 16,631 19,021 7,500 65,324 n/a 529 24,1';0 18,782 43,374 195,601
Kiribati 20 72 2,165 23 145 2,425
Niue 3 250 11 264
New Caledonia 876 84 6,633 25 208,547 644 37,264 92,640 3,637 350,350
Papua New Guinea 135,780 5,815 18,350 37,284 2,203 293,790 29,497 313,542 62,259 898,520
French Polynesia 67 198 2.073 1 16,313 4,092 2.315 1,155 371 26,585
Solomon Islands 1,460 651 6.310 8,105 4 12,233 2,190 16,858 16,182 63,993
Tonga 2,370 2,217 342 17 112 993 556 6.607
Vanuatu 769 7,346 2,102 307 20,871 31,395
Western Samoa 305 3,988 1,080 73 6,372 928 750 2,016 15,512
TOTAL: 158,080 34,300 43,143 112,994 234,413 320,174 207,278 44~,864 150,092 1,705,338
Sources: SPC, 1982(b). Table J, pp. 12-14 and p. 3 for exchange rates used.
Government of Fiji, 1982(a). Table 8.4, p. 57.
_' Excludes re-exports; note thatlhe estimates for Fiji apply to 1961.
Table III-17: SOURCE OF IMPORTS ($000)
Source South EUROPE
Importing New PtlCific United United Other
Country Australia Zealand Region Kingdom France Others States Japan Countries Total
American Samoa (79-80) 1,962 6,344 .2,482 14 16 67,414 4,032 1,225 83,489
Cook Islands (80) 1,643 12,448 237 628 241 639 1,019 1,548 1,944 20,347
Fiji (81) 196,247 75,883 n/a 29,868 1,948 nfa 39,216 -'37,312 115,660 546,134
Kirib,lli (80) 9.675 882 1,097 947 4 35 1,226 2,180 803 16.849
Nauru (78-79) 9,628 930 10,556
Niue (80) 17 2,132 575 16 5 34 93 42 2,914
New Caledonia (80) 42,612 16,473 1,913 5,413 134,328 36,322 19,564 18,167 123,395 398,187
Papua New Guinea (80) 362,589 35,816 1,075 37,237 1,628 35,927 57,283 160,362 196,611 888,528
French Polynesia (80) 15,407 24,544 963 6,860 227,459 43,630 99,943 16,984 41,825 477,615
Solomon Islands (81) 18,459 5,694 nfa 5,325 n/a 1,230 2,648 9,860 22,617 65,833
Tonga (80) 9,478 11,369 1,547 1,036 54 202 1,897 1,807 2,743 30,133
Tuvalu (80) 1,467 148 995 290 0 31 12 59 143 3,145
Vanuatu (80) 16,256 4,692 7,128 910 5,141 5,230 23,628 62,985
Western Samoa (80) 11,474 16,115 1,916 3,278 70 1,700 4,637 5,241 9,666 56,297
TOT AL: 696,914 215,470 19,920 91.622 370,873 119,737 295,093 312,875 540,302 2,663,014
Sourc~s: SPC, 1962(b), Table 3, pp. 10-13.
GovNnrnenl "I FijI, 1~82(a). TJble B.7, p. 61.
Government of Solomon IslJnds. 19B2(b). Table 4, p.4.
'j;\ hi (' i'~'-l tl,J
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1. OUTLDIE OF THE PROJECT






Ta ril a v u (':, S u va, F i j i
Ministry of Health & Social
Helf2re, Fiji
THE GRANT AID PROJECT BY THE
GOVE~NMENT OF JAPAN.




II OUTLINE OF SCHOOL









Feb, 1985 - Mar, 1986
Unsettled (15 months)




Total 360 students, 3 grade
(120 students/grade)
3 years
Two j. n take
4 Trimesters/year
2 . p 0 S l 3 a sic C0 u r s e (~,1j d ',-I 1 f e & Pub 1 i c He 2 1 t h Nu r s e )




6 Ii 4 months
T I. ice iJ yea r
Azusa Sekkei Co. Chief Architect. Suva. Aug./1985.
Biumaiwa, T.M. Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Health. Suva.
Aug./19c35.
Hunt, P. Chief officer of the Fiji Fisheries Division. Lami.
Aug./1985.
Japarese fisheries experts. Tongatapu. Aug./1985.
Japanese medical experts. Tongatapu. Aug./1985.
JOCV (Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteers) volunteer. Apia.
Aug./1985.
Kavaliku, Langi S. Honolulu. June/1985.
Officer of the Western Samoa Fisheries Division. Apia. Aug./1985.
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(JICA, 1984. Tile' :~f>v:)
To~le 1V-19: BREAKOmm OF OVERSEAS STUDENTS
Country I 1981 I 1982 1983II
I
Basic nurse Wa 11 i s 1 - -
Tuvalu 2 I 4 -
Tokelau 1 1 -
I
Total I 4 T 5 -
-
I-Post basic TTPI - 2 2
I
Tonga I - 1 2I
Cook Islands 1 1 1
Vanuatu 3 1 1
Tokelau I - , -I
I
Solomon Islands i 3 - 2
I
I
Gil bert Islands 3 3 3






Total J 11 10 ' 1
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